Alien  Litigation as Polity-Participation: The Positive Power of a  Voteless Class of Litigants by Kanstroom, Daniel
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 21 | Issue 2 Article 5
"Alien" Litigation as Polity-Participation: The
Positive Power of a "Voteless Class of Litigants"
Daniel Kanstroom
Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Daniel Kanstroom, "Alien" Litigation as Polity-Participation: The Positive Power of a "Voteless Class of
Litigants", 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 399 (2012), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol21/
iss2/5
“ALIEN” LITIGATION AS POLITY-PARTICIPATION:
THE POSITIVE POWER OF A
“VOTELESS CLASS OF LITIGANTS”
Daniel Kanstroom*
Well-funded illegal alien activists in Southern California have found
a new way to attack Americans fighting for secure borders and en-
forcement of current immigration laws. The fight has moved from
the streets where they wave the [sic] their Mexican flag to America’s
civil courtrooms.
—Quote from an article posted on Ron Paul Forums, Feb. 9, 20101
Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation.
—Arizona v. United States2
Again and again, the cure for corruption, withdrawal, and alienation
is . . . aliens.
—Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner3
INTRODUCTION
The framing title of this Symposium—Noncitizen Participation in the American
Polity—seems to present an obvious contradiction: How can noncitizens, who are
by legal definition “aliens”4 and often seen as “outsiders;”5 who are frequently de
* Professor of Law and Director of International Human Rights Program, Boston College
Law School. Thanks to Dean Vincent Rougeau and the Law School Fund for support. Thanks
to my co-participants at the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium for thought-
ful comments on my earliest drafts, to Kari Hong, Benjamin Kanstroom, Laura Murray-Tjan,
Sheldon Novick, and Rachel Rosenbloom for helpful later comments, and to the journal editors.
1 Nemesis, Comment on RON PAUL FORUMS (Feb. 10, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://www
.ronpaulforums.com/showthread.php?230730-Illegal-Aliens-sue-for-the-right-to-work-in-US
(quoting Kimberly Dvorak, Illegal Alien Lawsuits Continue to Clog the Courts in California,
EXAMINER.COM (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/article/illegal-alien-lawsuits-continue
-to-clog-the-courts-california).
2 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
3 BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 4 (2001).
4 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006) (“The term ‘alien’ means any person not a cit-
izen or national of the United States.”). This Article will use the term “alien” where legally
precise, and “noncitizen” more generally, as that is less pejorative in common discourse. Those
noncitizens who lack legal status will be termed “undocumented” for the same reason. See,
e.g., Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering U.S.
Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 576 (2004)
(“Scholarly and popular concerns about the phrase ‘illegal alien’ abound, pointing out that
the phrase is racially loaded, ambiguous, imprecise, and pejorative.” (footnotes omitted)).
5 See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA 166 (3d ed.
2006) (“The multiplication of outsiders is not a model for a viable society. . . . If immigrants
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scribed as lacking full “membership” in society;6 and who rarely, if ever, have the
right to vote, participate in the polity? In particular, can the undocumented—who by
definition have violated U.S. law, who face the existential epithet of being “illegal
aliens,” and who have been well-described as living under “a regime of enforced
invisibility”7—possibly do so? Are they even part of the polity? And if they do
somehow manage to participate, how should we assess such actions?
The apparent contradiction is largely illusory. Noncitizen participation in the
American polity (including the participation of undocumented noncitizens), though
mostly undertaken by means other than voting, has long been a reality in the United
States.8 This historical fact remains true notwithstanding such current initiatives as
Arizona’s cynical policy of “attrition through enforcement.”9
This Article examines such participation and considers a provocative normative
claim: noncitizen polity-participation is a crucial, positive engine of constitutional
evolution and, as such, an essential component of politico-legal legitimacy. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion was clearly right, in Arizona v. United States, to affirm that
“[i]mmigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation.”10 This is equally true of
noncitizen polity-participation in its various forms.11 Litigation by noncitizens is a
surprisingly large—and surprisingly under-appreciated—aspect of the deep truth also
noted by Justice Kennedy, that “[t]he history of the United States is in part made of
the stories, talents, and lasting contributions of those who crossed oceans and deserts
to come here.”12
do not feel that they are fully part of this society, as American as everyone else, then we are
failing.” (quoting RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMHOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB: THE
FRAGMENTING OF AMERICA (1985))).
6 See, e.g., Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 544 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“And if they choose, they may apply for full membership in the national polity through nat-
uralization.”); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (“Resident aliens, like citizens, pay
taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways
to our society.”).
7 CRISTINA BELTRÁN, THE TROUBLE WITH UNITY 134 (2010).
8 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441(e)(b)(2) (2006) (allowing campaign contributions by noncit-
izens lawfully admitted for permanent residence); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148
(1945) (“Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country”).
9 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (noting that Arizona’s “Support
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” which has the stated purpose to “dis-
courage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons
unlawfully present in the United States,” seeks to establish an official state policy of “attrition
through enforcement” (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 note (2012) (West))).
10 Id. at 2510.
11 It goes well beyond the classic question of whether citizenship can possibly be thought
of as “the right to have rights.” See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM
379 (2004); see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267–68 (1967); Perez v. Brownell, 356
U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
12 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
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Litigation by noncitizens is always a controversial topic, especially when cases
are brought by the undocumented or their advocates. As a prominent retired ICE
agent has put it:
Allow me to understand this correctly. Illegal aliens, people who
have committed a crime by entering this country illegally, and
who continue to commit additional crimes by using counterfeit
documents to project a status they are not entitled to, are suing
cities and citizens for disrupting their RIGHT to work in the US,
even though they have no such right? . . . It’s time for the good
citizens of this country to fight back through the courts . . . .13
An online commenter responded, “They do have nerve. How on earth can anyone
living in a country illegally have the audacity to sue for ANYTHING. . . . Only
in America.”14
Such sentiments have percolated up into legislative proposals. In 2010, Texas
State Representative Leo Berman (R-Tyler) introduced a bill that sought to prevent
people who are in this country illegally from filing lawsuits or other claims in Texas
courts.15 “If he is in the United States illegally, he shouldn’t have access to our courts,”
explained Berman.16 Even federal judges have expressed concerns of this type. In
2010, the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma considered chal-
lenges to the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, which had
sought to prohibit various forms of polity-participation by noncitizens.17 Although
the undocumented plaintiffs had Article III standing, the court would not consider
their claims for “prudential” reasons.18 As the judge noted, courts have traditionally
refused “to entertain cases” brought by “plaintiffs with unclean hands.”19 However,
13 Kimberly Dvorak, Illegal Alien Lawsuits Continue to Clog the Courts in California,
EXAMINER.COM (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/article/illegal-alien-lawsuits-continue 
-to-clog-the-courts-california (quoting retired ICE Agent John Sampson, who now runs CSI
Consulting and Investigations) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 Benicar, Comment on Illegal Alien Lawsuits Continue to Clog the Courts in Cali-
fornia, CITY-DATA FORUM (Feb. 10, 2010, 8:01 AM), http://www.city-data.com/forum
/illegal-immigration/891903-illegal-alien-lawsuits-continue-clog-courts.html#ixzz1zwtGfj9x.
15 H.B. 294 82d Leg. (Tex. 2011), available at ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/bills/82R/billtext
/html/house_bills/HB00200_HB00299/HB00294I.htm.
16 Jim Forsyth, Proposal Would Strip Illegals of Access to Texas Courts, WOAI LOCAL
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2010), http://radio.woai.com/cc-common/news/sections/newsarticle.html?feed
=119078&article=7938306#ixzz1zwv3DY6U.
17 Nat’l Coal. of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-CV-613-JHP, 2007 WL 4390650,
at *2 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2007); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d
742, 750 (10th Cir. 2010) (granting a partial preliminary injunction).
18 Nat’l Coal. of Latino Clergy, 2007 WL 4390650, at *8.
19 Id. at *9.
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the judge moved from this basic principle of equity to the conclusion that the “illegal
alien Plaintiffs seek nothing more than to use this Court as a vehicle for their con-
tinued unlawful presence in this country.”20 To allow them to do so, the judge con-
cluded, would make him an “abetter of iniquity,” a result he found “unpalatable.”21
The judge then adopted what he termed:
a new, and narrow, prudential limitation on standing. An illegal
alien, in willful violation of federal immigration law, is without
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state law, when
compliance with federal law would absolve the illegal alien’s
constitutional dilemma—particularly when the challenged state
law was enacted to discourage violation of the federal immi-
gration law.22
Such logic has inspired others. The unpublished Oklahoma opinion was promi-
nently featured in the brief authored by attorney/activist Kris Kobach before the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Lozano v. City of Hazelton.23 The brief argued that
“this prudential standing rule” was “based firmly in Supreme Court precedent.”24 The
“closing of the courthouse doors,” wrote Kobach, was justified for “those tainted
with inequitableness or bad faith related to the matter in which they now seek relief.”25
This argument was properly rejected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals as “partic-
ularly troubling.”26 But the court’s reasoning on this point was summary.27
20 Id.
21 Id. (emphasis added).
22 Id.
23 620 F. 3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); Appellant’s Reply
Brief, Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F. 3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 07-3531), vacated, 131
S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
24 Appellant’s Reply Brief at *7, Lozano, 620 F.3d 170 (No. 07-3531) (arguing further
that it was also based upon “the equitable maxim that . . . ‘he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands’”(citing Nat’l Coal. of Latino Clergy, 2007 WL 4390650, at *24)).
25 Id. (quoting Nat’l Coal. of Clergy, 2007 WL 4390650, at *24). For this reason, the
brief argued, “[i]llegal alien Appellees similarly lack standing to challenge local barriers that
impede their unlawful presence.” Id.
26 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 630 F. 3d 170, 193 n.18 (3d Cir. 2010).
27 The court described the argument as “particularly troubling” because, “both in substance
and tone, [it] fail[ed] to appreciate that whatever a person’s immigration status, an alien is
surely a ‘person’ entitled to Due Process Clause protections.” Id. at 194 (quoting Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court therefore
has “considered judicial challenges brought by persons lacking lawful immigration status,
even when ‘compliance with federal law’ would have absolved ‘the illegal alien’s constitu-
tional dilemma.’” Id. at 194 (citations omitted) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579
(1974), for the proposition that “[t]he right of access to the courts . . . is founded in the Due
Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the
judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights”).
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Debates about the propriety and wisdom of noncitizen (“alien”) litigation as
polity-participation are hardly new. Most modern concern is about the undocu-
mented. But historically, courts have had to engage similar questions against an
ever-changing backdrop of legal statuses. The Dred Scott28 case, for example, was
most specifically about federal diversity jurisdiction.29 The primary question, accord-
ing to Chief Justice Roger Taney, was related to citizenship status and the possibility
of litigation in federal courts:
The question is simply this: Can a negro whose ancestors were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member
of the political community formed and brought into existence by
the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled
to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that
instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of
suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the
Constitution?30
The Court’s answer was clear and easy to report. As stated in the New York Daily
Times, the holding was: “Negroes, whether slaves or free, that is, men of the African
race, are not citizens of the United States by the Constitution.”31 This meant that, as
the Plaintiff was held not to be a citizen of Missouri, there could be no diversity
jurisdiction and the case had to be dismissed.32 An essential underlying idea was that
28 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superceded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
29 Indeed, as that was the technical basis for the holding, the rest was, strictly speaking,
dicta, notwithstanding Justice Taney’s arguments to the contrary. As Chief Justice Roger
Taney had put it,
The defendant pleaded in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court,
that the plaintiff was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged
in his declaration, being a negro of African descent whose ancestors
were of pure African blood and who were brought into this country
and sold as slaves.
Id. at 400.
30 Id. at 403.
31 Decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott Case, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Mar. 7,
1857 (emphasis added), available at http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big
/0306.html#article.
32 See id. (“As the plaintiff was not a citizen of Missouri, he, therefore, could not sue in
the Courts of the United States. The suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”) The
Court conceded that there were many cases, “civil as well as criminal, in which a Circuit
Court of the United States may exercise jurisdiction although one of the African race is a
party.” Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 425. However, Justice Taney simply noted:
[T]hat broad question is not before the court. The question with which
we are now dealing is whether a person of the African race can be a
citizen of the United States, and become thereby entitled to a special
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for purposes of national citizenship, “[t]he words ‘people of the United States’ and
‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing.”33
To understand this sort of reasoning, we must engage some difficult definitional
and interpretive questions. Although we can define citizens and noncitizens with a
fair degree of legal precision,34 such other terms as participation and polity are in-
herently much more complex.35 Indeed, the terms’ definitions inform our understand-
ing of the aspirations and potentially exclusionary aspects of citizenship itself.36
Polity-participation is prototypically accomplished by voting, the practice most
directly linked to political legitimacy in a democracy.37 As Martin Luther King, Jr.
once famously asserted, an “unjust law,” by definition, “is a code inflicted upon a
minority which that minority had no part in enacting or creating because they did
not have the unhampered right to vote.”38 Surprisingly to many, there is no clear text
based federal constitutional right to vote in U.S. elections (even for citizens) though
the judiciary has long recognized its significance and need for protection.39 However,
privilege by virtue of his title to that character, and which, under the
Constitution, no one but a citizen can claim.
Id.
33 Id. at 404 (“They both describe the political body who, according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government
through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and
every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.”).
34 There are, of course, many (many!) articles and books on the history, meaning, and com-
plexities of the concept of citizenship itself. To list them all here would be cumbersome and
probably impossible. I will refer to various theorists as appropriate as the Article proceeds.
35 See generally LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN (2006).
36 As Professor Saskia Sassen notes, “In its narrowest definition citizenship describes
the legal relationship between the individual and the polity. This relation can in principle
assume many forms, in good part depending on the definition of the polity.” Saskia Sassen,
The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics,
2 GLOBALIZATIONS 79, 81 (2005) [hereinafter Sassen, The Repositioning of Citizenship and
Alienage]. For an earlier version of this paper, see Saskia Sassen, The Repositioning of
Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics, 46 BERKELEY J. SOCIOLOGY 4
(2002); see also JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 3
(1991) (“The struggle for citizenship in America has, therefore, been overwhelmingly a
demand for inclusion in the polity . . . .”); Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 455 (2000) (noting diverse interpretations of the relationship
between citizenship, polity, and community participation).
37 Recent challenges to “voter ID” laws illustrate the continuing struggle to ensure equal
opportunity to vote even among U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Legal Battles Erupt
as Voters Fear Exclusion by Tough ID Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2012, at A1 (describing
“a number of voter-identification suits across the country that could affect the participation
of millions of voters” and advocates arguments that such laws “ensur[e] the integrity of
elections” and “[prevent] voter fraud”).
38 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE
289, 294 (J. M. Washington ed., 1986).
39 See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“This equal right to vote is not absolute.” (internal quotation marks
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voting is the one act of civic engagement that is almost universally denied to non-
citizens in the United States.40 Indeed, voting may be a ground for the removal of
a noncitizen,41 as well as for criminal charges.42 The constitutional rights to run for
omitted)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“Undoubtably the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter . . . .”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)
(“[V]oting . . . [t]hough not regarded strictly as a natural right . . . nevertheless . . . is
regarded as a fundamental political right . . . .”). But see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433 (1991) (“It is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the most fundamental significance under our
constitutional structure.’” (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184 (1979))). “The Judiciary is obliged to train a skeptical eye on any qualification
of that right.” Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” (citing Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 562)). For examples of the Court denying a right to suffrage, see Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that a Native American born into the Chinook Tribe was
not a U.S. citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment) and Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162, 176 (1874) (upholding a statute denying the franchise to women).
40 Historically, this has been a much more open subject. Many states and territories (and
the colonies) allowed foreigners to vote. See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens:
The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1391, 1392–93 (1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right
to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1092–93 (1977); cf. CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE 9, 15 (1960). It was only in 1931 that a political scientist could opine that “[f]or
the first time in over a hundred years, a national election was held in 1928 in which no alien
in any state had the right to cast a vote for a candidate for any office—national, state, or local.”
Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 114 (1931).
41 The Immigration and Nationality Act speaks to unlawful voting.
(A) In general. Any alien who has voted in violation of any Federal,
State, or local constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, or reg-
ulation is deportable.
(B) Exception. In the case of an alien who voted in a Federal, State, or
local election (including an initiative, recall, or referendum) in vio-
lation of a lawful restriction of voting to citizens, if each natural
parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adop-
tive parent of the alien) is or was a citizen (whether by birth or nat-
uralization), the alien permanently resided in the United States prior
to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the
time of such violation that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall
not be considered to be deportable under any provision of this sub-
section based on such violation.
8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(6) (2006).
42 The statute reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any alien to vote in any election held sole-
ly or in part for the purpose of electing a candidate for the office
of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the
Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from
the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, unless—
(1) the election is held partly for some other purpose;
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federal elective offices and various rights not to be discriminatorily denied the vote
are also expressly limited to citizens.43
The most basic justification for such limitations is the view that voting is a sine
qua non of democratic membership, and that citizenship is the legal proxy for such
membership.44 The arguably unjust aspects of this system regarding noncitizens are
mitigated by the doctrine that even “illegal aliens” are persons entitled to due process
protections by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of jus soli citizenship, by jus
sanguinis laws, and by the relatively open nature of contemporary U.S. naturalization.45
A common rejoinder to advocates of noncitizen voting is thus: “If immigrants really
want to become part of their community, why don’t they make the commitment to
become U.S. citizens?”46 This is a complex and important debate; but my purpose
in this Article is not to revisit it.47
(2) aliens are authorized to vote for such other purpose under
a State constitution or statute or a local ordinance; and
(3) voting for such other purpose is conducted independently
of voting for a candidate for such Federal offices, in such
a manner that an alien has the opportunity to vote for such
other purpose, but not an opportunity to vote for a candi-
date for any one or more of such Federal offices.
18 U.S.C. § 611 (2006). Many states have similar laws. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1
(West 2010) (requiring citizenship and residency to vote).
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1 (“The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). The
limitation of the right against discriminatory denial of the vote does not mean that noncit-
izens cannot vote. The Nineteenth Amendment is similarly limited: “The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. However, the Seventeenth Amendment is not
expressly limited to citizens, using the term, “people.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
44 “Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, told [the
Harvard Political Review], ‘The idea that we are somehow looking down at immigrants by
not letting them vote until they jump through very easy hoops is willfully incorrect.’” Simon
Thompson, Voting Rights: Earned or Entitled?, HAR. POL. REV. (Dec. 3, 2010), http://hpronline
.org/united-states/voting-rights-earned-or-entitled/.
45 But see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
3 (2007) (noting difficulties and costs of naturalization); David S. North, The Long Grey
Welcome: A Study of the American Naturalization Program, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 311,
325–26 (1987) (noting inefficiencies in INS naturalization procedures); Thomas A. Gryn &
Luke J. Larsen, Nativity Status and Citizenship in the United States: 2009, American Community
Survey Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 2010), http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs
/acsbr09-16.pdf (finding that in 2009, 44% of foreign-born U.S. residents are citizens).
46 Thompson, supra note 44 (quoting Hans von Spakovsky, a senior legal fellow at the
Heritage Foundation).
47 For a most interesting analysis of the difficulties with the very concept of citizenship
and low U.S. naturalization rates, see Alan Hyde, Overcoming Citizenship: Five Practical
Steps for Overcoming the Hierarchy of Nationality (2012) (unpublished paper) (on file with
the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal).
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Citizenship status is of course a much narrower concept than either polity-
membership or polity-participation.48 Although the category of citizenship articu-
lates certain legal rights and responsibilities, “the mechanisms through which this
articulation is shaped and implemented can be . . . [usefully] distinguished from the
status itself.”49 Indeed, as Saskia Sassen has noted, the meaning of citizenship is
“partly produced by the practices of the excluded.”50 This insight is truer still of
polity-participation.51 Noncitizens—even if undocumented—are powerfully present
in the United States, as in many other countries.52 These “unauthorized yet recognized”
people participate in the community where they reside—raising families, schooling
children, holding jobs, etc.53 Such informal enactments of dimensions of citizenship
may “produce an at least partial recognition of them as full social beings.”54
This Article focuses on litigation as a form of polity-participation. I use as a
touchstone Robert Jackson’s choice of phrase in the 1950 case of Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath.55 When describing the noncitizens whose procedural rights were at issue
in deportation hearings (arguably governed by the new Administrative Procedure
Act) Jackson called them “a voteless class of litigants.”56 He continued to describe
them as people “who not only lack the influence of citizens, but who are strangers
48 See BOSNIAK, supra note 35 (2006). As the Supreme Court put it in 2002: “Although
the word ‘citizen’ may imply (and in 1789 and 1875 may have implied) the enjoyment of
certain basic rights and privileges, a ‘subject’ is merely ‘[o]ne who owes allegiance to a
sovereign and is governed by that sovereign’s laws.’” JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic
Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88, 99 (2002) (citations omitted).
49 Sassen, The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage, supra note 36, at 83; see also
AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY 37 (2009) (comparing the acquisition of
citizenship at birth to inheriting untaxed property by noting that “birthright citizenship mech-
anisms provide cover through their presumed naturalness for what is essentially a major (and
currently untaxed) transmission of wealth and enabling resources from one generation to
another”). See generally JACQUELINE STEVENS, REPRODUCING THE STATE (1999) (describing
how political society changes individuals through citizenship); JACQUELINE STEVENS, STATES
WITHOUT NATIONS: CITIZENSHIP FOR MORTALS (2010) (exploring the moral and social impli-
cations of citizenship).
50 Sassen, The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage, supra note 36, at 84. Many
citizens, are, of course, excluded from full polity-participation due to race, ethnicity, religion,
gender, sexual orientation, poverty, felony disenfranchisement, etc. See, e.g., Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of California’s felon disenfran-
chisement statute).
51 As Sassen puts it, “citizenship is becoming a normative project whereby social mem-
bership becomes increasingly comprehensive and open ended.” Sassen, The Repositioning
of Citizenship and Alienage, supra note 36, at 85.
52 Id. (noting that daily activities and an “informal social contract” bind undocumented
immigrants to their communities).
53 Id. Such practices may “earn them citizenship claims . . . even as the formal status and,
more narrowly, legalization may continue to evade them.” Id.
54 Id.
55 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
56 Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
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to the laws and customs in which they find themselves involved and who often do
not even understand the tongue in which they are accused.”57 This phrasing prompts
questions: What relationship between voting and litigation and what understandings
of noncitizen polity-participation does such a nomenclature imply? Is litigation by
“voteless” noncitizens, perhaps ironically, related to processes of democratic self-
government? If so, should it be encouraged or limited?
Part I of this Article explores models of noncitizen polity-participation from a
philosophical perspective and then through the lenses of citizenship and the idea of
the polity. Part II then explores various examples of noncitizen litigation and ex-
plores the substantial influence of such cases well beyond the immigration or the
“aliens’ rights” arenas. My focus is particularly on what “votelessness” has to do
with noncitizen litigation: i.e., the relationship between those two ideas as we seek
to understand such litigation as legitimate—perhaps essential—polity-participation.
The point is not to justify current exclusions or to somehow use access to courts as
a substitute for the full and free polity-participation that a (properly) weak version
of citizenship and a truly strong version of human rights protections would entail.
Rather, the goal is to develop a strong rejoinder to those who decry or seek to re-
strict litigation by “illegal aliens” and other noncitizens.
Jackson’s phrase illuminates how litigation by noncitizens, both defensive and
affirmative, is a powerful form of polity-participation. This will undoubtedly strike
some readers as a strange assertion. Litigation is more typically seen as an alternative
to polity-participation than as a form of it.58 Some aspire to maintain a bright-line
distinction between law and politics. As a recent New York Times editorial criticized
a Supreme Court decision: “In this labor union case, there is no getting around that
the legal approach is indistinguishable from politics.”59 But one does not have to be
a doctrinaire legal realist to see that such a rigid dichotomy cannot withstand much
scrutiny. Although the contingency of legal reasoning has been well-described as
“the most corrosive message of legal history”60 the message is by now fairly well-
accepted.61 An overly formal or rigid line between politics and law obscures both the
inevitably political aspects of legal decisionmaking and the inevitably legal aspects of
majoritarian democratic power in a constitutional democracy.62 It seeks to separate
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy
Making, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1840 (2008) (“Tort litigation has traditionally been under-
stood as a means of dispute resolution . . . .”).
59 Editorial, The Anti-Union Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2012, at A18.
60 See, e.g., Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 13 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990).
61 Aron Ketchel, Deriving Lessons for the Alien Tort Claims Act from the Sovereign
Immunities Act, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 191, 207–08 (2007) (presenting examples of interference
in legal disposition by the executive and legislative branches of government).
62 The controversy surrounding the Bush v. Gore decision derived in part from the fact
that it demonstrated both of these problems simultaneously. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
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phenomena that are inherently intertwined, indeed that depend for their legitimacy
upon each other. As Robert Post has put it, “[j]udicial decision making is always
enveloped within a larger political context that endows judicial work with legiti-
macy and effectiveness.”63 It is as much a reductionist mistake to view politics as the
realm of irrational preferences as it is to view law as the realm of transcendent
“neutral principles.”64 Simply put, “no sharp disjunction can be legislated between
law and life, between judge and context, between neutrality and value.”65
This may seem a rather commonplace insight when stated at a high level of
generality. The focus on noncitizen litigation, however, illuminates not only the in-
evitably intertwined nature of law and politics but also the uniquely significant role
played by outsiders in the revitalizing enterprise of U.S. constitutional discourse.
Consider the cover title of Time magazine’s recent story about young, undocu-
mented people in the United States: WE ARE AMERICANS.66 But then there is an
asterisk: *Just not legally.67 We all know what this means: functional societal mem-
bership may differ from legal status. But for those who equate polity-membership
with legal citizenship status, it is a powerful and dangerous claim.68
Its implicit power, like that of assertions by undocumented noncitizens of legal
rights, may explain the strong negative responses it provokes. For example, those
who opposed Legal Services funding for cases brought by “illegal aliens,”69 de-
scribed such litigation as the promotion of illegal immigration.70 Kenneth Boehm,
111 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd, 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
63 Robert Post, Festschrift, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship
Between Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1322 (2010).
64 Id. at 1323. As Post later argues, law should be understood “as a specific social practice
expected to promote social solidarity in a particular way.” Id. at 1340.
65 Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture
in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 220 (1999).
66 Feifei Sun, Behind the Cover: America’s Undocumented Immigrants, TIME, June 14,
2012, at 1.
67 Id.
68 It challenges our understanding of the relationship between noncitizens’ polity-
participation and the law itself.
69 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a)(11), 110 Stat. 1321, 50 (1996) (“None of the funds appropriated . . .
to the Legal Services Corporation may be used to provide financial assistance to any person
or entity . . . that provides legal assistance [to] any alien, unless the alien is present in the
United States and is [a legal permanent resident, is a close relative to a citizen and has an
application pending for status as a lawful permanent resident, has been granted asylum or
admission as a refugee including conditional entry as a refugee prior to April 1, 1980, whose
order of deportation has been withheld by the Attorney General, or belongs to a narrow cat-
egory of lawfully admitted agricultural workers].”).
70 Solving the Core Problem of the Legal Services Program: Hearing on the Legal
Services Corporation Reauthorization Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law
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who served as counsel to the LSC board of directors from 1991 to 1994,71 likened
LSC programs representing noncitizens to “heavy lobbying efforts, abortion litiga-
tion, referendum campaigns and a host of other prohibited activities.”72 Boehm’s
fears are powerfully framed in ways that show how much is at stake in the debate:
Imagine a national network of experienced lawyers available to
illegal aliens, free of charge, to sue government at the local, state,
and national levels to obtain housing, education, welfare, and
other governmental benefits. Imagine further that this national
network of lawyers was also available to lobby, participate in
referenda campaigns, and provide public relations services on
behalf of their illegal alien clientele, again free of charge be-
cause the network was largely subsidized with federal funds. For
good measure, imagine that this network of activist lawyers was
also available to fight deportation of illegal aliens, even those
with serious criminal records.73
of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Penny Pullen, Former
Director, The Legal Services Corporation). Such views connect with those of critics who
attacked the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) for “pursuing a ‘radical agenda’ and for
‘engaging in dubious litigation that is of no real benefit to poor people.’” Recent Legislation,
Congress Imposes New Restrictions on Use of Funds by the Legal Services Corporation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1346 (1997).
71 The Legal Services Program: Unaccountable, Political, Anti-Poor, Beyond Reform and
Unnecessary: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Government Programs and Oversight of the
H. Comm. on Small Business, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Kenneth Boehm, Chairman,
National Legal and Policy Center) [hereinafter Boehm Testimony].
72 Legal Services Corporation: A Textbook Case of an Unaccountable Program: Hearing
on the Legal Services Corporation Reauthorization Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Kenneth
Boehm, Chairman, National Legal and Policy Center). 
73 Ken Boehm, Legal Services Corporation Programs Aid Illegal Immigrants, 29 IMMIGR.
REV. 15 (1997), available at http://www.cis.org/LegalServicesCorporation-FederalFunding
ImmigrantActivists. In 1998 congressional testimony, Boehm linked representation of “illegal
aliens” to a parade of horribles: “The fact that legal services lawyers have litigated to expand
the welfare state, overturn elections, challenge political redistricting, promote gay rights,
oppose welfare reform, and support welfare for illegal aliens is beyond dispute.” Boehm
Testimony, supra note 71, at 5; see also Kenneth F. Boehm, The Legal Services Program:
Unaccountable, Political, Anti-Poor, Beyond Reform and Unnecessary, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 321, 358 (1998) (describing issues with the LSC program). As Boehm more recently
put it, “It was when they were giving legal assistance to illegal aliens, getting involved in
redistricting cases, prison litigation and drug-related evictions, that they got in trouble.” See
Peter Flaherty, Boehm Takes Aim at Legal Services Corporation in National Law Journal
Interview, NAT’L LEGAL & POL’Y CENT. (Mar. 14, 2011), http://nlpc.org/stories/2011/03/14
/boehm-takes-aim-legal-services-corporation-national-law-journal-interview.
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One could—and many others besides Kris Kobach and Kenneth Boehm do—
view noncitizen litigation as an annoyance, something to be, at most, grudgingly
tolerated, if not limited, discouraged, or eliminated.74 As Peter Schuck piquantly put
it some years ago, “We should stop crying wolf about nativism . . . [and we should
celebrate] America’s openness to self-supporting, law-abiding newcomers who don’t
demand special breaks.”75 Such “special breaks” included what others have called
basic due process protections in deportation proceedings.76
How might one respond to such statements? The most common rejoinder views
litigation by undocumented or deportable noncitizens in a sort of protective or tragic
mode.77 On this view, rights litigation by noncitizens is a necessary corrective to
(arguably legitimate) political exclusion from voting.78 Such litigation is on this view
necessary to prevent extreme exploitation and to rectify and prevent certain types of
wrongful conduct against noncitizens. Undocumented noncitizens are, for example,
“especially vulnerable” to workplace exploitation.79 They may find it almost impos-
sible to enforce workplace protection rights due to fear of deportation.80 Indeed,
even those who are legally present may be vulnerable to exploitation because of lack
of language skills, lack of familiarity with the legal system, isolation, and depend-
ency on employers for “housing, food and other necessities of life.”81 There is surely
important truth to all of this. But it is an incomplete and, I will suggest, unduly de-
fensive model. It relies upon simplistic understandings of polity-participation and of
constitutional democracy itself, especially in a self-styled “nation of immigrants.”82
This Article offers a much more affirmative model. I contend that noncitizen
polity-participation through litigation (whether defensive or affirmative) is neither
74 See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 148 (1998).
75 Id. at 148.
76 See, e.g., Editorial, For Want of a Good Lawyer: Deportation Without Representation,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2011, at SR14 (“Current laws have denied basic due process protections
to people held in immigration detention.”). Schuck’s view was that “‘[b]eating the system’ has
become a game it seems that almost any resourceful alien equipped with easily obtained fraud-
ulent documents or a competent lawyer can successfully play.” SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 70.
77 See Sure-Tran, Inc v. NRLB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (noting the necessity of alien
litigation as an enforcement mechanism preventing the creation of “a subclass of workers”).
78 See, e.g., William R. Tamayo, The Role of the EEOC in Protecting the Civil Rights of
Farm Workers, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1082 (2000) (describing how fear of deporta-
tion inhibits undocumented workers, or documented workers with undocumented people in
their family, from enforcing their legal rights).
79 Id. at 1075.
80 Id. at 1082.
81 See Laura K. Abel & Risa E. Kaufman, Preserving Aliens’ and Migrant Workers’ Access
to Civil Legal Services: Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491,
492–94 (2003).
82 See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (“As a Nation we exhibit extraor-
dinary hospitality for those who come to our country, which is not surprising for we have
often been described as a ‘nation of immigrants.’” (footnote omitted)).
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a tragic corrective nor an annoyance. Rather, it is part of the dynamic process of
defining the polity itself and of mediating the inevitable tension between majori-
tarian power and the “rule of law.” Indeed, it should be seen as an essential compo-
nent of the revitalizing project of American constitutional democracy. As Bonnie
Honig has suggested, we should reframe the traditional question: “How should ‘we’
solve the problem of foreignness?”83 That question inevitably leads us to ask what
“we” should do about “them.” A more intriguing and useful inquiry is: “What prob-
lems does foreignness solve for us?”84
We should thus rethink the legal role of “illegal aliens” whom Mae Ngai ele-
gantly named “impossible subjects.”85 Ngai’s essential point was that the “illegal alien
[w]as a . . . legal and political subject, whose inclusion within the nation was . . . a
social reality and a legal impossibility.”86 Actual participation in the workforce, in
local communities, in small businesses and in schools and other community entities
was accompanied by a lack of basic rights and the exclusion from citizenship.87 There
is surely value in this characterization, but I want to consider reframing noncitizens
(including in particular those with no legal status) as not only possible subjects, but as
inevitable subjects. This approach thus connects with that of Hermann Cohen: “[I]n
the alien, [therefore], man discovered the idea of humanity.”88 Through noncitizens’
legal participation in the polity, we discover richer, more just ideas of participation
and of the polity itself.
My aim, to reiterate, is not to justify the disenfranchisement of noncitizens.
Judith Shklar and Jamin Raskin have strongly articulated normative and practical
arguments in favor of voting by noncitizens.89 As Raskin has put it, “[T]he current
blanket exclusion of noncitizens from the ballot is neither constitutionally required
83 HONIG, supra note 3, at 4.
84 Id.
85 MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA (2004).
86 Id. at 4. In this, she echoed Marianne Constable, who—a decade earlier—noted that,
“the ‘unlawfulness’ or ‘illegality’ of the illegal alien is such that the alien individual seems
not quite an autonomous legal subject, being neither legally-recognized citizen nor legally-
recognized stranger.” Marianne Constable, Sovereignty and Governmentality in Modern
American Immigration Law, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 249, 260 (Austin
Sarat & Susan S. Sibley eds., 1993). Therefore, Constable continued, “they come to resemble
under the law . . . the regulatable resources of the territory more than its self-determining
subjects.” Id.
87 See Ngai, supra note 85.
88 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 233 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting THE SONCINO PRESS, JEREMIAH 52 (A. Cohen ed., H. Freeman trans., 7th impres-
sion 1973)).
89 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 37 (1991) (noting that “natural-rights
theory makes it very difficult to find good reasons for excluding anyone from full political
membership in a modern republic”); Raskin, supra note 40.
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nor historically normal.”90 This is especially true of disenfranchisement at the local
level since resident aliens, “who are governed, taxed, and often drafted just like
citizens—have a strong democratic claim to being considered members, indeed
citizens, of their local communities.”91 Jeremy Waldron has highlighted the powerful
psychological and emotional costs of exclusion from voting.92 As Waldron notes,
exclusion from the right to participate in collective decisions causes an insult that:
does not require [an individual] to think that his vote—if he had
it—would give him substantial and palpable power. He knows
that if he has the right to participate, so do millions of others. All
he asks . . . is that he and all others be treated as equals in mat-
ters affecting their interests, their rights, and their duties.93
One must also take care not to overstate the ability of courts to effect ma-
jor social change.94 Still, people who do not (and who may not) vote participate
in the polity in important ways. Through litigation, they help to define the rules
of constitutional democracy.95 Ultimately, then, this Article advocates that we fo-
cus more seriously on how, as Alex Aleinikoff once put it, “the story of non-
members and members of ‘quasi-polities’ may be as significant as the story of
disfavored full members.”96
90 Raskin, supra note 40, at 1394; see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162,
177 (1874) (“[C]itizenship has not in all cases been made a condition precedent to the
enjoyment of the right of suffrage.”).
91 Raskin, supra note 40, at 1394; see also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING
8–9 (2006) (arguing in favor of treating “lawful immigrants as Americans in waiting,” pre-
sumptively entitled to all the prerogatives of membership); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens,
Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 10 (1990) (“[I]f member-
ship is to be the guiding principle for constitutional analysis of the immigration power, then
the circle of membership should include permanently residing aliens.”).
92 These are very different concerns from the simply instrumental idea that voting equates
with power.
93 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 239 (1999).
94 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (arguing
that many have vastly overstated both the Supreme Court’s indignation and ability to protect
the rights of politically weak racial minorities). But see David E. Bernstein & Ilva Somin,
Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 593, 626–40 (2004) (explaining
ways in which courts have had significant impacts).
95 As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted recently, “[l]ack of the franchise
is a substantial, although certainly not the sole, concern underlying the rule that classification
on the basis of alienage is generally suspect.” Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector
Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1278 n.20 (Mass. 2011).
96 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1689, 1690 (2001).
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I. WHAT IS NONCITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITY?
Gentlemen, I regard all of you here present as kinsmen, intimates,
and fellow citizens by nature, and not by convention. For like is
akin to like by nature, but convention, which tyranizes the human
race, often constrains us contrary to nature.
—Plato, Protagoras97
So now I am alone in the world, with no brother, neighbour or
friend, nor any company left me but my own. . . . So now they are
strangers and foreigners to me; they no longer exist for me . . . . But
I, detached as I am from them and from the whole world, what am I?
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Reveries of the Solitary Walker98
A. Frameworks
Do noncitizens participate in the polity? Should they? If so, how? What does
such participation mean in terms of political legitimacy, justice, and fairness? Many
Western liberal philosophers of political legitimacy have tended to marginalize or
bracket concerns about noncitizens’ polity-participation.99 Although questions of how
to treat either the “entrance seeker who wishes to become one of us” or “the foreign
resident among us”100 have acquired practical and moral importance, “only scant
political philosophical attention has been devoted to them.”101 Locke and Kant “took
the bounded community to be the locus of political justice and left those bounds
themselves unchallenged.”102 John Rawls, in Political Liberalism, posed the basic
problem of legitimacy as how “there may exist over time a stable and just society
of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible
97 PLATO, PROTAGORAS 33 (Stanley Lombardo & Karen Bell trans., 1992).
98 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, REVERIES OF THE SOLITARY WALKER 27 (Peter France
trans., 1979).
99 See, e.g., William James Booth, Foreigners: Insiders, Outsiders and the Ethics of
Membership, 59 REV. POL. 259, 263 (1997).
100 Id. at 263. For example, “the alien who though not [or not yet] a citizen is still more
bound to us than someone simply passing through, referred to by Simmel as ‘Der Gast,
der bleibt’ (‘The guest who stays.’).” Id. at 264. See Almut Loycke, Der Gast, der Bleibt.
Dimensionen von Georg Simmels Analyse des Fremdseins, in DER GAST, DER BLEIBT:
DIMENSIONEN VON GEORG SIMMELS ANALYSE DES FREMDSEINS 103–09 (1992).
101 Booth, supra note 99, at 264–65. Indeed, “what ought to have been eminently ques-
tionable has scarcely achieved the status of a question.” Id. at 265.
102 Id. at 265. See also Veit Bader, Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy,
Community, and Justice. Or, What Is Wrong with Communitarianism?, 23 POL. THEORY 211
(1995) (considering reasons for the historical neglect of these questions).
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religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”103 Rawls’s most well-known answers
were confined to citizens: “[P]olitical power is legitimate only when it is exercised
in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all
citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human
reason.”104 To be sure, some, like John Stuart Mill, have offered regrets about the
strong “distinction between their fellow countrymen and foreigners” while still sup-
porting it as necessary in the current state of things.105 But in many respects, as Bruce
Ackerman has noted, political philosophy has rather “unthinkingly” accepted the idea
“that we have the right to exclude non residents from our midst.”106 From this, it
might seem a relatively short leap to exclude those who are among us from partici-
pating in the polity at all. Hence, enforcement by attrition.107
Thinkers of a more communitarian cast have offered justifications for such
exclusions. Aristotle asserted that “no one would choose the whole world on con-
dition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to
live with others.”108 On this view, “man is by nature a political animal.”109 As Jeremy
Waldron notes, “[w]e are most distinctively human, according to the Aristotelian
tradition, when we talk with one another and come to share common views about
the social good, about right and wrong, about justice and injustice.”110 From such
103 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii (1993) (emphasis added). In 2001, Rawls
restated his inquiry thus: “[I]n the light of what reasons and values—of what kind of a con-
ception of justice—can citizens legitimately exercise . . . coercive power over one another?”
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 41 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
104 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 103, at 41 (emphasis added). This is not to
say that Rawlsian principles cannot be used to generate a theory of the rights of noncitizens,
within or across nation-states. Professor Joseph H. Carens has suggested that “many of the
reasons that make the original position useful in thinking about questions of justice within
a given society also make it useful for thinking about justice across different societies.”
Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
CULTURES 331, 334 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) (citation omitted). But Rawls himself never
did so. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36 (1993). When he
sought to apply his theory of justice beyond the framework of a bordered community, Rawls
almost exclusively focused on relations between states. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF
PEOPLES (2002).
105 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 311 (1862).
106 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93 (1980).
107 See supra note 9.
108 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 238 (David Ross trans., 1954);
see also Waldron, supra note 93, at 137.
109 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 37 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984). The primary proof of this for
Aristotle was that “man alone among the animals has speech. . . . [S]peech serves to reveal
the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust.” Id.
110 Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 751, 772 (1992). Such conversational abilities allow us to achieve “collectively . . .
a better view than any individual could have attained on her own.” Id. This is a “collective
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Aristotelian foundations one can rather easily move to Michael Walzer’s famous
assertion that “[t]he primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in
some human community.”111 Such “membership structures all [of] our other distrib-
utive choices: it determines with whom we make those choices, from whom we re-
quire obedience and collect taxes, [and] to whom we allocate goods and services.”112
Thus, the exclusion of noncitizens (physically and politically) may be justified by
the right of communities to self-determination. Individual rights claims do not
necessarily count as trump.113 As Walzer provocatively put it, “[t]he distribution of
membership is not pervasively subject to . . . justice.”114 Outside of community one
must rely on such notions as hospitality or charity115 or, perhaps—in modern legal
parlance—discretion.116
The most direct rejoinder to the communitarian model is a cosmopolitan one.
The Greek word kosmopolitês, which may be translated as “citizen of the world,”
embodies the aspirational (or, perhaps, empirically describable) idea that all human
beings, regardless of their political affiliation, constitute a single community.117
wisdom of the multitude.” Id. It is perhaps not a great leap from this premise to more contro-
versial proposals such as “English only” laws. And many contemporary communitarians are
more than happy to jump in this way. See generally id.
111 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31 (1983).
112 Id.
113 Indeed, Walzer strongly asserts (rather problematically in my view) that “[e]very sub-
stantive account of distributive justice is a local account” that cannot be overridden by “external
or universal principles.” WALZER, supra note 111, at 314. Thus, even an apparently unjust caste
system in India must be accepted if the members of the community believe it to be natural or
just. One obvious problem with this model is how one deals with lack of education or expo-
sure to critical insights among the lower classes.
114 Id. at 61.
115 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 146, 148 (1988); see
also Booth, supra note 99, at 270.
116 The right to community self-determination is not completely unconstrained, however;
and it does not necessarily justify unfettered internal discrimination based on citizenship status.
Indeed, as Carens notes, Walzer strongly defends “an obligation to provide aid to those in”
extreme “need,”—even complete strangers who are aliens—if we can help them “without
excessive cost to ourselves.” Carens, supra note 104, at 342. Further, if people are admitted
as residents and participants in the economy (there is some ambiguity here as to undocu-
mented workers), they have the right to naturalize as citizens. See WALZER, supra note 111,
at 60; Carens, supra note 104, at 342–43. This right derives from a basic principle of com-
munal self-determination which would conflict with a permanent caste system. Carens, supra
note 104, at 342; see WALZER, supra note 111, at 60. “Democratic citizens,” Walzer writes,
“have a choice: if they want to bring in new workers they must be prepared to enlarge their
own membership.” WALZER, supra note 111, at 61. Finally, “new states or governments may
not simply expel existing inhabitants even if they are regarded as alien by” a majority group.
Carens, supra note 104, at 343; see also WALZER, supra note 111, at 61–62 (discussing the
ability of some residents to deny citizenship to other residents).
117 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, BOS. REV. (1994), available
at http://bostonreview.net/BR19.5/nussbaum.php.
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There are, of course, many variants of cosmopolitan thought, ranging from Diogenes
the Cynic’s famously vague claim to be such a “citizen of the world”118 to Martha
Nussbaum’s nuanced argument that support for nationalist sentiments “subverts,
ultimately, even the values that hold a nation together, because it substitutes a col-
orful idol for the substantive universal values of justice and right.”119
A cosmopolitan conception of human identity rejects the notion of a hard line
between citizens and noncitizens. The accident of birth should on this view be largely
irrelevant to one’s identity, rights, and commitments. As Jeremy Waldron once ele-
gantly put it:
The cosmopolitan may live all his life in one city and maintain
the same citizenship throughout. But he refuses to think of him-
self as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or
his language. Though he may live in San Francisco and be of Irish
ancestry, he does not take his identity to be compromised when
he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea,
listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori princess on Japanese
equipment, follows Ukrainian politics, and practices Buddhist
meditation techniques. He is a creature of modernity, conscious
of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self.120
In terms of moral obligation, the strongest cosmopolitan view is that the duty to
provide aid to foreigners is the same as that which applies to locals or compatriots.121
This does not mean of course that cosmopolitans are necessarily blind to the poten-
tial dangers of a complete dismissal of the importance of cultural or ethnic com-
munities. As Waldron recognizes, “a world in which deracinated cosmopolitanism
flourishes is not a safe place for minority communities.”122 But apart, perhaps, from
118 DIOGNES LAERTIUS, 2 LIVES OF THE EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 65 (R.D. Hicks trans., 1981).
119 Nussbaum, supra note 117. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM ET AL., FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY 5 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
120 Waldron, supra note 110, at 754 (1992).
121 See, e.g., KWAME A. APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS
xii (2006); WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 165 (1989); MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006); ONORA O’NEILL, BOUNDS OF JUSTICE (2000);
PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD (2002); Nussbaum, supra note 119.
122 Waldron, supra note 110, at 761. He continues by noting that:
[o]ur experience has been that they wither and die in the harsh glare of
modern life, and that the custodians of these dying traditions live out
their lives in misery and demoralization.
We are dealing, in other words, with conceptions of man and so-
ciety which, if not actually inconsistent, certainly are opposed in some
important sense. Each envisions an environment in which the other is,
to a certain extent, in danger.
Id.
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such minority protection, the cosmopolitan view tends towards a highly robust af-
firmation of noncitizen participation in the polity, expansively defined. As Martha
Nussbaum has put it, “[w]e should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its
fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.”123
Jürgen Habermas has suggested other useful ways of thinking about the relation
between noncitizens’ polity-participation and constitutional democracy. His recog-
nition of a deep structural connection between the legal institutionalization of hu-
man rights and the necessary communicative conditions for (legitimate) political
will-formation explains not only the utility but perhaps also the inevitability of
noncitizens’ legal participation.124 The relevant relationship, for our purposes, was
sketched by Habermas as follows: “Informal public opinion-formation generates
‘influence’; influence is transformed into ‘communicative power’ through the chan-
nels of political elections; and communicative power is again transformed into ‘ad-
ministrative power’ through legislation.”125 Noncitizens clearly participate in this
transmission of power at step one: informal public opinion-formation. But “law” is
never a static end state.126 As noted, it has inevitably political components that are
channeled through judicial interpretations. Thus, noncitizens, when they litigate, are
integrally part of this cyclical, iterative process.
Finally, we should consider agonistic models.127 Chantal Mouffe argues that “we
need a democratic model able to grasp the nature of the political.”128 “This,” she con-
tinues, “requires developing an approach, which places the question of power and an-
tagonism at its very center.”129 More specifically (and more relevant for our purposes)
123 Nussbaum, supra note 117.
124 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER 192 (Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De
Greiff eds., 1998).
125  J. Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in 1 CONSTELLATIONS 8 (1994);
see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 192 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
As Abdollah Payrow Shabani has noted, “This influence, carried forward by communicative
power, gives law its legitimacy, and thereby provides the political power of the state its binding
force.” Abdollah Payrow Shabani, Paper Presented at Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy,
Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms: Legitimizing Power? (Aug. 10–15, 1998), available
at http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Poli/PoliShab.htm.
126 As Habermas writes, “human rights belong structurally to a positive and coercive legal
order which founds actionable individual legal claims.” HABERMAS, supra note 125, at 192.
127 See ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY
(2d ed. 1985) (arguing that social objectivity is constituted through acts of power); CHANTAL
MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000).
128 CHANTAL MOUFFE, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY OR AGONISTIC PLURALISM 13 (2000).
129 Id.; see Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 66 SOC. RES.
745, 752 (1999) [hereinafter Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy] (explaining that democratic
theory needs to acknowledge the ineradicability of antagonism and the impossibility of achiev-
ing a fully inclusive rational consensus); see also Chantal Mouffe, Citizenship and Political
Identity, 61 OCTOBER 28 (1992).
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she writes “that any social objectivity is ultimately political” and must “show the
traces of exclusion that governs its constitution.”130 Put more systematically:
Politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and
diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an “us” by
the determination of a “them.” The novelty of democratic poli-
tics is not the overcoming of this us/them [opposition—which is
an impossibility—] but the different way in which [it] is estab-
lished. What is at stake is how to establish this us/them discrimi-
nation in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy.131
The goal, in short, “is to construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it is no longer per-
ceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but an ‘adversary’, i.e., somebody whose ideas
we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question.”132
Bonnie Honig has similarly argued strongly for a commitment to maintaining
fidelity to the remainders of politics.133 These are “those persons who do not fit the
requirements of the orders in which they happen to find themselves living.”134 Atten-
tion must be paid to those “undone oughts that haunt political life and to those parts
of all persons that are ill fitted to dominant norms and forms of subjectivity and kin-
ship, whether we mark this ill-fittedness as queer, feminine, unconscious, criminal or
resistant.”135 Such “[a]gonistic cosmopolitanism . . . engenders acts of citizenship and
claims of right across borders, on behalf of the remainders of the state system.”136
In the more specific context of U.S. legal culture, we must also bear in mind the
important rights-based insights listed by David Cole that explain why we should resist
“the temptation to trade [their] rights for [our] security.”137 As Cole notes, such a trade
(“the double-standard”) “is: (1) illusory in the long run; (2) likely to prove counterpro-
ductive as a security matter; (3) a critical” component of later-regretted “overreaction
130 Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 129, at 752 (emphasis added).
131 Id. at 755.
132 MOUFFE, supra note 128, at 15.
133 See generally BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS
(1993) (discussing a type of politics that she calls “virtù,” or a contestatory politics of virtue
and virtù, also called “agonism”).
134 Gary Browning, An Interview with Bonnie Honig, 7 CONT. POL. THEORY 434, 436
(1998).
135 Id. (emphasis added). The agonistic cosmopolitan approach is ambivalent and wary of
Kantian or Habermasian international extensions of law. See id. at 439–40. The concern is
that “they are themselves modes of governance that will engender their own remainders and
injustices, while also relieving constituencies very often of the felt need for democratic re-
sponsibility and activism.” Id.; see also SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITAN (Robert
Post ed., 2006).
136 Browning, supra note 134, at 440.
137 COLE, supra note 88, at 11 (emphasis added).
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in times of crisis; . . . [(4)] constitutionally and morally wrong.”138 But what is wrong
is not only rights-deprivation, it is also voice deprivation.139 Note the essential weaving
together of politics and law that this combined view demands.140 Who is most likely
to bring the most important forms of truly revitalizing litigation? Outsiders, the mar-
ginalized, and the oppressed are the obvious answers.141
B. Citizenship, Rights, and Polity-Participation
As Alexander Bickel noted in 1973, “[i]n the view of both the ancients and of
modern liberal [U.S.] political theorists, the relationship between the individual and
the state is largely defined by the concept of citizenship.”142 Citizenship may control
not only membership; but, according to some, “[i]t is by virtue of . . . it, that [the
138 Id. at 7.
139 As Jack Balkin has argued, a forward-looking redemptive commitment has always been
a crucial part of U.S. constitutional history. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:
POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
7 (1998) (highlighting the three great jurisgenerative “constitutional moments” of the Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal). To the extent that the U.S. polity essentially views the
Constitution as a form of “civic religion,” its dynamic, evolutionary legitimacy relies upon
certain original constitutional understandings of “We the People.” Ken I. Kersch, Beyond
Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional Redemption, 71 MD. L. REV.
229, 272–73 (2011). As Ken Kersch has rightly noted, this is a very different vision from
standard legal academy accounts of originalism, which emphasize restoration, not redemp-
tion. Id. at 271–72.
140 Indeed, it is worth pondering the obvious fact that the framers were not citizens.
141 Consider Bruce Ackerman’s distinction between constitutional “monists” from “dualists.”
The monist (interestingly, Ackerman cites Robert Jackson as one) “treats every act of judicial
review as presumptively anti-democratic, and strains to” solve the “‘countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty’ by . . . ingenious argument.” Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 465 (1989). “In contrast,” writes Ackerman, “the dualist sees” courts’
“preservationist function . . . as an absolutely essential part of a well-ordered democratic
regime.” Id. “The courts,” on this view, “serve democracy by protecting the hard-won judg-
ments of a mobilized citizenry against fundamental change by political elites who have failed
to establish the requisite kind of mobilized support from the citizenry at large.” Id. Ackerman,
unfortunately, does not much consider the essential importance of noncitizens’ legal claims to
this dualist dynamic. This is a critically important aspect. It goes beyond the claims of those
denominated by Ackerman as “rights foundationalists.” The point is not only that “rights
trump democracy.” It is that certain kinds of rights claims—those brought by noncitizens—
especially enhance the dynamic evolution of U.S. constitutional democracy.
142 Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369,
369 (1973) [hereinafter Bickel, Citizenship]; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT 33 (1975) [hereinafter BICKEL, MORALITY].
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individual] has rights.”143 Remarkably, though, as Bickel highlighted, “national citi-
zenship plays only the most minimal role in the American constitutional scheme.”144
Article I requires that members of the House of Representatives and members of the
Senate be citizens.145 Article II requires that the President and Vice-President be nat-
ural born citizens.146 Otherwise, citizenship is “noticeably absent” from the rest of the
document.147 The concept was ambiguously used (when used at all) by the Framers.148
It surely was not seen as a proxy for the possession of basic human rights.149 “The
Preamble,” as Bickel noted, “speaks of ‘We the people of the United States,’ not, as
it might have, of we the citizens of the United States at the time of the formation of
143 BICKEL, MORALITY, supra note 142, at 33; see also Bickel, Citizenship, supra note
142, at 369.
144 BICKEL, MORALITY, supra note 142, at 33; see also Bickel, Citizenship, supra note
142, at 369.
145 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
146 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
147 See Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity,
84 MICH. L. REV. 1504, 1508 (1986) (“[I]n looking at the text, one is struck initially by the
lack of importance of citizenship . . . . Nothing in [A]rticle III requires that federal judges be
citizens, nor does anything in the Constitution require that ambassadors, federal officials, or
governmental employees of any kind be citizens.”).
148 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). The first judicial exegesis of
this provision was apparently in 1825:
What these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended under
the following general heads: protection by the government, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as
the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1873); see also Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (“[T]he privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each
State in the several States, by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities
which are common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws by
virtue of their being citizens.” (emphasis added)). But the key constitutional understanding,
according to Justice Miller was reciprocity not rights. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. at 77. The Court in The Slaughter-House Cases held that:
[i]ts sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever
those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as
you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same,
neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of
other States within your jurisdiction.
Id.
149 See, e.g., Bickel, Citizenship, supra note 142, at 369–70 (noting the only definitions/
uses of “citizenship” in the Constitution); see also Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation
as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 238–39 (2011).
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this Union.”150 A quick scan of the language of the Bill of Rights shows the same
thing: First, “Congress shall make no law”;151 Second, “the right of the people”;152
Third, “any house”;153 Fourth, “[t]he right of the people”;154 Fifth, “[n]o person”;155
Sixth, “the accused”;156 Seventh, “the right of trial by jury”;157 Eighth, “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required”;158 Ninth, “retained by the people”;159 and Tenth, “ or to the
people.”160 As Attorney General Edward Bates carefully opined in 1862, in reaction
to the Dred Scott case:
In my opinion, the Constitution uses the word citizen only to
express the political quality of the individual in his relations to
the nation; to declare that he is a member of the body politic, and
bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on the one
side and protection on the other.161
It was, of course, in the wake of Civil War, that national citizenship came to be
seen generally in a more substantive way.162 The “rights of man” were increasingly con-
ceived of as a more general, amorphous set which framed certain more specifically
(federally) guaranteed rights of citizens.163 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
begins with the first Constitutional definition of citizenship: “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States.”164 It concludes, however, by barring any state from
depriving “any person of life, liberty or property without due process” or from deny-
ing “to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.”165 This was, in short, a work
150 BICKEL, MORALITY, supra note 142, at 36 (emphasis added); see also, Bickel, Citizenship,
supra note 142, at 370.
151 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
152 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
153 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
154 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
155 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
156 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
157 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
158 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
159 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
160 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
161 Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 388 (1868). It is rather chilling to note that the actual
question presented was: “Is a man legally incapacitated to be a citizen of the United States
by the sole fact that he is a colored, and not a white man?” Id. at 383.
162 See James Fox, Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship and the Reconstruction-Era Black
Public Sphere, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1245, 1247–48 (2009); Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin
the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST.
REV. 45, 47–49 (1987).
163 See generally Fox, supra note 162; Kaczorowski, supra note 162.
164 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
165 Id. (emphasis added).
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in progress.166 The constitutional text still reveals a vision of government in which
citizenship may be required for national voting and for a few constitutionally desig-
nated positions; but, it is not a constitutional prerequisite “for any other form of
participation in government nor for benefiting from the individual rights guaranteed
by the Constitution.”167
The plaintiffs’ lawyers in The Slaughter-House Cases argued that “[t]he doc-
trine of the ‘States-Rights party’ . . . [had been that] there was no citizenship in the
whole United States, except sub modo and by the permission of the States.”168 Accord-
ing to that (discredited, losing) theory, they argued, “the United States had no inte-
gral existence except as an incomplete combination among several integers.”169 The
Fourteenth Amendment, they argued, “forever destroyed” such doctrines.170 The key
to the consolidation of “the several ‘integers’ into a consistent whole” was national
citizenship.171 “The tie between the United States and every citizen in every part of
its own jurisdiction has been made intimate and familiar.”172 Although this theory
did not prevail in its first major Supreme Court appearance, the concept of national
citizenship achieved new meaning and importance. As Justice Bradley wrote in his
dissent in The Slaughter-House Cases:
Here again we have the great threefold division of the rights of
freemen, asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty
and property. These are the fundamental rights which can only
be taken away by due process of law . . . [t]hese rights, I contend,
belong to the citizens of every free government.173
The linkage between citizenship status and rights became especially important
for voting. The Fifteenth Amendment states that “[t]he right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . by any State on account of race,
166 As Justice Bradley put it in his dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases:
It was not necessary to say in words that the citizens of the United States
should have and exercise all the privileges of citizens; the privilege of
buying, selling, and enjoying property; the privilege of engaging in any
lawful employment for a livelihood; the privilege of resorting to the laws
for redress of injuries, and the like. Their very citizenship conferred
these privileges, if they did not possess them before.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 119 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
167 Schauer, supra note 147, at 1509.




172 Id. at 53.
173 Id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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color, or previous condition of servitude.”174 As Justice Miller noted, “The negro
having, by the fourteenth amendment, been declared to be a citizen of the United
States, is thus made a voter in every State of the Union.”175
National citizenship also came to be seen as the vertex of a power triangle, the
bases of which were “allegiance” and “protection.”176 As Senator Lyman Trumball,
the floor manager of the Fourteenth Amendment, had put it:
How is it that every person born in these United States owes
allegiance to the Government? . . . [C]an it be that our ancestors
struggled through a long war and set up this Government, and
that the people of our day have struggled through another war,
with all its sacrifices and all its desolation, to maintain it, and at
last that we have got a Government which is all-powerful to com-
mand the obedience of the citizen, but has no power to afford
him protection? . . . Sir, it cannot be. Such is not the meaning of
our Constitution. Such is not the meaning of American citizen-
ship. This Government . . . has certainly some power to protect its
own citizens in their own country. Allegiance and protection are
reciprocal rights.177
Five years later, John Bingham cited Daniel Webster for the idea that, “[t]he mainte-
nance of the Constitution . . . . relies on individual duty and obligation. . . . [T]he
Government owes high and solemn duties to every citizen of the country. It is bound
to protect him in his most important rights and interests.”178
Symbolically, these uses of citizenship status after the Civil War were, at least
in part, a reaction to Justice Taney’s Dred Scott reasoning that black people “had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect . . . and that the negro might justly
and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.”179 As Bickel put it, “The original
174 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).
175 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
176 Speaking in 1859, John Bingham asserted that citizenship rights included:
The equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue and
to utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their
toil . . . . [T]hat all men, before the law, are equal in respect of those
rights of person which God gives and no man or state may rightfully
take away.
CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., 2D SESS. 985 (1859).
177 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1757 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumball);
see also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 425, 432 (2d ed. 2005).
178 See CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. 85 (1871) (quoting 3 DANIEL WEBSTER’S
WORKS 469, 470).
179 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superceded by consti-
tutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As Justice Field noted in his dissent to The
Slaughter-House Cases, Chief Justice Taney’s syllogism had proceeded as follows:
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Constitution’s innocence of the concept of citizenship was thus violated in the Dred
Scott case.”180 With the Civil Rights Act of 1866,181 the concept of citizenship was
revived, as a status upon which a set of rights depended.182 Bickel argues that this
was simply “a matter of syntactic compulsion, of stylistic necessity, . . . a matter of
the flow of the pen.”183 However, it is clear that the framers (and supporters) of the
post–Civil War amendments saw national citizenship as the most plausible and
practical legalistic framing for the expansive protective powers they envisioned.184
The strongest potential implications of this model were thwarted by the Court in The
Slaughter-House Cases, especially with respect to the privileges and immunities
clause.185 However, the powerful rhetoric of citizenship status as the source of rights
endures, as in Justice Warren’s famous Arendtian overstatement that citizenship is
“the right to have rights.”186 The possible unintended negative consequences of this
model were demonstrated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who once argued that because
[T]he words “people of the United States” and “citizens” were syn-
onymous terms; that the people of the respective States were the parties
to the Constitution; that these people consisted of the free inhabitants of
those States; that they had provided in their Constitution for the adop-
tion of a uniform rule of naturalization; that they and their descendants
and persons naturalized were the only persons who could be citizens of
the United States, and that it was not in the power of any State to invest
any other person with citizenship so that he could enjoy the privileges
of a citizen under the Constitution, and that therefore the descendants
of persons brought to this country and sold as slaves were not, and
could not be citizens within the meaning of the Constitution.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 95 (Field, J., dissenting).
180 BICKEL, MORALITY, supra note 142, at 40.
181 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31 § 1, 4 Stat. 27.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 As Justice Miller noted in The Slaughter-House Cases, there had been great contro-
versy about the definition of citizenship and the relevance of the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Dred Scott. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72–73. “No such definition was pre-
viously found in the Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define it by act of
Congress. It had been the occasion of much discussion in the courts, by the executive de-
partments, and in the public journals.” Id. at 72. Indeed, Miller stated that the Dred Scott
decision had “met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitutional
lawyers of the country [but] had never been overruled . . . [were it] to be accepted as a
constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the negro race who had recently
been made freemen, were still, not only not citizens, but were incapable of becoming so by
anything short of an amendment to the Constitution.” Id. at 73. Joseph Story, also opined
contemporaneously that the purpose of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was “to
put at rest forever the question whether colored persons were to be recognized as citizens.”
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 653 (Thomas
M. Cooley ed., 4th ed., 1873).
185 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 74–75.
186 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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there is a constitutional “basic difference between citizens and aliens,” alienage
classifications are not subject to “strict scrutiny.”187
In general, however, noncitizens’ rights claims have long been a powerful counter-
narrative to voting exclusion and a leitmotif in U.S. politico-legal discourse.188 It is
now well-settled that, “[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is
surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose pres-
ence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed
due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”189
James Madison, in his critique of the Alien and Sedition laws of the Adams Ad-
ministration, sought to explain why aliens who were “not parties to the Constitution”
still could not legitimately be subjected to “an absolute power.”190 As Madison wrote,
[even if] aliens are not parties to the Constitution, it does not
follow that the Constitution has vested in Congress an absolute
power over them. . . .
If aliens had no rights under the Constitution, they might not
only be banished, but even capitally punished, without a jury or
the other incidents to a fair trial.191
Madison further noted that “[a]liens are not more parties to the laws than they
are parties to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed, that as they owe, on one
hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protection and ad-
vantage.”192 Madison’s formulation that “aliens are not parties to the Constitution”193
implies a link among full membership (as a “party”), polity-participation, and rights.
Thomas Jefferson’s concern that, if oppressive laws are tolerated against the “friend-
less alien” then oppressive actions against the citizen “will soon follow” similarly
defends fundamental rights by noncitizens.194 Such a concern could indicate a citizen-
centric view of rights (i.e., the only defect in a law that oppresses aliens is that it might
187 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649–50 (1972) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating
that alienage is not a suspect classification which requires strict scrutiny).
188 Indeed, even the Declaration of Independence itself cited impediments to naturalization
among its “long train of abuses.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, 9 (U.S. 1776).
189 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
190 James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 556
(Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2d ed. 1876).
191 Id.; see also GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 58 (1996).
192 Madison, supra, note 190, at 556; see also NEUMAN, supra note 192.
193 Madison, supra note 190, at 556. It is odd because of the ambiguity as to who was a
pre-constitutional citizen or alien.
194 See Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY
181 (Henry Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963).
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someday be deployed against citizens). But this was surely not Jefferson’s point, nor
is it a defensible theory in a constitutional democracy that takes minority and aliens’
rights at all seriously. The better reading is that this concern indicates an awareness
that we are all in this polity, this democratic/constitutional enterprise together, re-
gardless of status. On this view, polity-participation by noncitizens is inevitably
connected to the nature and evolution of all rights claims.195
Consider in this light the evocative power of the public testimony offered by
undocumented “Dreamers.” As one twenty-one-year-old college student, Marie
Gonzalez, testified in 2007, she had resided in the U.S. since she was five years
old.196 After the harrowing day when a caller from the governor’s office requested
that her family members “confirm” their immigration status, her life became “a haze
of meetings with attorneys, hearings, and rallies.”197 Two support groups were
formed by her church, community members, and fellow students.198 One—its very
name a powerful sign of polity-participation by the undocumented—was called “We
Are Marie.”199 Though Marie was allowed to stay in the United States for one year,
195 It is not very far from this to Carolene Products, footnote 4. United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Political activists have seen the power of con-
necting noncitizens’ rights to the nature of the U.S. polity itself, as compared with abstract
rights claims. In a pamphlet they authored as they faced deportation from the United States
to Russia, Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman strenuously evoked this tradition:
And, finally, the most infamous and most inhuman method of Czarist
Russia, the method that sacrificed hundreds of thousands of the finest
and bravest men and women of Russia, and systematically robbed the
country of the very flower of its youth, is now being transplanted on
American soil, in these great United States, the freest democracy on earth.
The dreaded Russian administrative process the newest American in-
stitutions! Sudden seizure, anonymous denunciation, star chamber pro-
ceedings, the third degree, secret deportation and banishment to unknown
lands. O shades of Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and Patrick Henry! That
you must witness the bloodiest weapon of Czarism rescued from the
ruins of defunct absolutism and introduced into the country for whose
freedom you had fought so heroically!
ALEXANDER BERKMAN & EMMA GOLDMAN, DEPORTATION, ITS MEANING AND MENACE
17 (1919).
196 See Comprehensive Immigration Reform: The Future of Undocumented Immigrant
Students: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security,
and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (testimony of
Marie Gonzalez) [hereinafter Comprehensive Immigration Reform]; see also, Rene Galindo,
Embodying the Gap Between National Inclusion and Exclusion: The “Testimonios” of Three
Undocumented Students at a 2007 Congressional Hearing, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 377,
384 (2011).
197 Comprehensive Immigration Reform, supra note 196, at 9–11.
198 Id. at 10.
199 Id.
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her parents were ordered deported.200 She rode with them on a float in a Fourth of
July parade the day before they were to leave the United States.201
Such symbols as “We Are Marie” and July 4 parades are uniquely powerful. This
is because the undocumented experience describes a “belonging that is at the same
time a non-belonging.”202 One young woman poignantly testified that, without the
DREAM Act, she would be “a perpetual foreigner in a country where I have always
considered myself an American.”203 In 2011, Jose Antonio Vargas described his life
as an undocumented immigrant as “living a different kind of reality.”204 Though he
was clearly present in society, he lived:
in fear of being found out. It means rarely trusting people, even
those closest to me, with who I really am. It means keeping my
family photos in a shoebox rather than displaying them on shelves
in my home, so friends don’t ask about them. It means reluctantly,
even painfully, doing things I know are wrong and unlawful. And
it has meant relying on a sort of 21st-century underground rail-
road of supporters, people who took an interest in my future and
took risks for me.205
Polity-participation, analogized as a sort of “coming out,” clearly makes a person
visible. It may also make one a political subject.206 Indeed, the courageous willingness
to testify publicly transports undocumented Dreamers from the “liminal space of non-
recognition”207 into both public consciousness and a more tangible, functional sort
of membership status. This is more than a rights claim: it embodies rights, polity-
participation, and moral discourse.
“Aliens,” Professor Peter Schuck once wrote derisively, “lack full membership in
the moral and political communities that create and sustain our system of justice.”208
The polity-participation of the Dreamers strongly challenges this assertion. As to
“political communities,” it is true that direct electoral participation in American poli-
tics by noncitizens has long been severely constrained: by voting laws, by the threat
200 Id. at 9.
201 Id. at 10.
202 Galindo, supra note 196, at 382–83.
203 Comprehensive Immigration Reform, supra note 196, at 15.
204 Jose Antonio Vargas, My Life as an Undocumented Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
June 26, 2011, at MM22.
205 Id.
206 Id.; see also Galindo, supra note 196, at 382–83.
207 See id. at 382 (citing JACQUES RANCIÈRE, DISAGREEMENT: POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY
(1999)).
208 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984).
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of deportation,209 and by such decisions as Bluman v. FEC,210 in which the Court
upheld restrictions on various forms of political involvement by foreigners.211 But
do “aliens” lack full membership in “moral” communities? This is a much harsher and
more debatable claim. Leaving aside the substantial problem of defining the bound-
aries of a “moral community,” (and what “full membership” could possibly mean,
morally), it is true that the moral claims made by noncitizens, even those who live
in the United States with families, have often fared poorly.212 (Such claims were
rather sharply described by Schuck as “provisional, contingent and seldom compel-
ling.”)213 But losing an argument does not mean that one is not part of a community
of discourse. The relationship between moral and political membership and “our sys-
tem of justice” is intricate and boundaries are porous. While exclusion from voting,
intimidation-by-deportation, and even a certain moral marginalization have surely
limited noncitizens’ ability to leverage political power, alternative pathways have
often been found to achieve voice and politico-legal influence, and to develop and
sustain new conceptions of justice itself.214
209 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN
DIASPORA 4–5 (2012) [hereinafter KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH]; KANSTROOM, supra note 45,
at 2.
210 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). See generally James
Ianelli, Noncitizens and Citizens United, 56 LOY. L. REV. 869 (2010) (discussing the effects
of voting laws on noncitizens).
211 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
212 See Peter H. Schuck, The Message of Proposition 187, 26 PAC. L.J. 989, 998–99
(1995); SCHUCK, supra, note 74, at 1, 18, 44.
213 SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 1.
214 This is not new. The phenomenon was also a big part of Jefferson’s presidential victory
in 1800, in the wake of the Alien and Sedition Acts debacle. See KANSTROOM, supra note 45,
at 46–63. From the beginning of the Republic to the present, politicians and pundits ranging
from Thomas Jefferson and John Adams to Woodrow Wilson and, more recently, Pete Wilson,
Pat Buchanan, Joe Arpaio, Barack Obama, and, perhaps, Mitt Romney have noted and de-
bated such phenomena in the realms of local and state politics and national lobbying efforts.
See, e.g., id. (discussing the views on immigration of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams,
particularly in reference to the Alien and Sedition Acts); Feds: Ariz. Sheriff Arpaio Violated
Civil Rights, CBS NEWS, Dec. 15, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57343614
/feds-ariz-sheriff-arpaio-violated-civil-rights/?tag=mncol;lst;1 (discussing Joe Arpaio’s views
on illegal immigration as well as an investigation into his treatment of illegal immigrants
within his custody); Elizabeth Llorente, Former Gov. Pete Wilson, Immigration Hardliner,
Named Honorary Romney Campaign Chair, FOX NEWS LATINO, Feb. 6, 2012, http://latino
.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/02/06/mitt-romney-names-former-gov-pete-wilson
-immigration-hardliner-as-honorary/ (discussing the views of Mitt Romney and Pete Wilson
on immigration within the Hispanic/Latino community); Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform in El Paso, Texas (May 10, 2011), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/10/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration
-reform-el-paso-texas (detailing a first-hand account of Barack Obama’s political views on the
issue of immigration). In recent years, naturalization by noncitizens and voter enrollment have
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C. What/Who Is the Polity?
In this way we are easily led into errors both of fact and principle.
We see individuals, who are known to be citizens, in the actual en-
joyment of certain rights and privileges, and in the actual exercise of
certain powers, social and political, and we, inconsiderately, and with-
out any regard to legal and logical consequences, attribute to those
individuals, and to all of their class, the enjoyment of those rights
and privileges and the exercise of those powers as incidents to their
citizenship, and belonging to them only in their quality of citizens.
—Opinion of Hon. Edward Bates, Citizenship215
The Stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel between him and our-
selves common features of a national, social, occupational, or gen-
erally human, nature.
—Georg Simmel216
Before we explore how litigation works as noncitizen polity-participation, let
us briefly consider the idea of “the polity.” Polity is a peculiarly intriguing word,
with important etymological complexities. It derives from the Greek word, polis,217
which most literally meant “city,”218 though it could refer to citizenship and to the
body of citizens in a city-state.219 The Latin noun, politia, is also related to the more
tended to highlight—one might say—the “panic” in Hispanic; Don Wolfensberger, Woodrow
Wilson, Congress and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in America: An Introductory Essay, WOODROW
WILSON INT’L CENTER FOR SCHOLARS (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites
/default/files/immigration-essay-intro.pdf (discussing Woodrow Wilson’s views on immi-
grants in America during his presidency). See generally GERALDO RIVERA, HIS PANIC: WHY
AMERICANS FEAR HISPANICS IN THE U.S. (2008). A 2011 essay posted on the website of the
Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) bemoaned the role of the Carnegie Endowment in sup-
porting and celebrating the rising political power of newly naturalized Latino voters. Jerry
Kammer, The Carnegie Corporation and Immigration: How a Noble Vision Lost Its Way,
CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (2011), http://www.cis.org/carnegie-immigration. The CIS author
notes “that recent immigrants and their children had doubled their presence in the U.S. elec-
torate between 1996 and 2008, totaling 10 percent of registered voters.” Id. He then quoted
Elizabeth Wood Johnson in what he perceived as an ominous warning: “Candidates—
especially those in close elections—would do well to take heed.” Id.
215 Citizenship, supra note 161, at 383–84.
216 GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 402–08 (K. H. Wolff ed. & trans.,
1950).
217  in Ancient Greek. Anitra Laycock, Poetry & Polity: Tragic Perspectives on the
Nature of Political Association, 13 ANIMUS 22, 22 (2009).
218 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 2269 (6th ed.
2007) [hereinafter OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY].
219 See generally MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, POLIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANCIENT
GREEK CITY-STATE (2006).
2012] “ALIEN” LITIGATION AS POLITY-PARTICIPATION 431
instrumental term, policy (which denotes a “course of action or principle adopted or
proposed by a government party, individual . . . any course of action adopted as ad-
vantageous, or expedient”).220 Polity, in early English usages, meant, simply, “[c]ivil
order or organization . . . an organized civil society.”221 The modern usage is perhaps
best defined as “an organized society” or “the state as a political entity.”222 Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary defines “polity” as: “political organization” or
“civil order;” it may also be defined, more simply, as “a form of government” or “a
politically organized unit.”223 The term is also sometimes used to legitimate particular
values through generalization. Justice Powell, for example, once described part of
the Voting Rights Act as an “encroachment” that was “especially troubling because
it destroys local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values
of our polity.”224
As a description of social groups, polity is broader than such concepts as race
or ethnicity. For example, H.A.L. Fisher wrote in 1936 of how the Scandinavian
“races” came to be accepted as “members of the polity of Europe.”225 A smaller
polity may, however, also be defined particularly, as having, for example a Celtic,
a feudal, a Presbyterian, or a democratic nature.226 The most fundamental meaning
of polity is thus general: the “body politic,” the state or an organized society.227
Definitions of polity do not require citizenship or even the state.228 The state is a
particular form of organization for the polity. Citizenship is a particular, status-based
220 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 218, at 2268.
221 Id. at 2270
222 Id. Oliver Goldsmith once described how “[t]he polity abounding in accumulated
wealth, may be compared to a Cartesian system, each orb with a vortex of its own.” OLIVER
GOLDSMITH, THE VICAR OF WAKEFIELD 120 (Arthur F. Hansen ed., 1911).
223 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1775 (unabridged ed. 2002).
224 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
225 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 218, at 2270 (quoting H.A.L. FISHER, A
HISTORY OF EUROPE, 183 (1936)).
226 See id. (“A particular form of government or political organization.”). An interesting
example of this usage occurred in 1811, when President James Madison vetoed a bill incor-
porating the Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria in what was then the
District of Columbia. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 982–83 (1811). Madison vetoed the bill on the
ground that it violated “the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and
violate[d], in particular, the article of the Constitution of the United States, which declares,
that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment.’” Id. As Madison ex-
plained: “The bill enacts into, and establishes by law, sundry rules and proceedings relative
purely to the organization and polity of the church incorporated.” Id.; see also Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 703–04 (2012) (discussing
Madison’s veto of the bill).
227 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 218, at 261.
228 Justice Stevens once invoked “the polity” in a decision involving zoning. Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 433 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (“Zoning is the process whereby a community defines its essential character.
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way of defining, organizing or limiting one’s relationship to the state and to the pol-
ity. In a well-known First Amendment case (involving a “four-letter expletive”), the
Supreme Court saw the two concepts as related, but distinct:
[The First Amendment] is designed and intended to remove gov-
ernmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests.229
A quarter century earlier, Justice Cardozo invoked a values-based conception
of “our polity” to determine the propriety of judicial oversight of state actions. “Is
that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so
acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those ‘funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and po-
litical institutions’?”230 In sum, when thinking about “noncitizen participation in the
polity” of the United States, broad understandings not only of modes of participa-
tion but also of the definition of the polity itself are justified both etymologically,
normatively, and historically.231
D. Aliens
Who, then, is an “alien?” Compared to “polity,” the term might seem simple
enough, owing to the binary “citizen/alien” divide. Alienage is, however, a residual
and (thus rather untidy) category, with no independent definition. An alien (or
Whether driven by a concern for health and safety, esthetics, or other public values, zoning
provides the mechanism by which the polity ensures that neighboring uses of land are not
mutually—or more often unilaterally—destructive.”). He also once invoked the intriguing and
unusual concept of the “international polity.” United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 102 (1986)
(“In the absence of evidence limiting use of Nantucket Sound to the inhabitants of its shores,
there is no reason to exempt these waters from such rights as innocent passage traditionally
enjoyed in common by all members of the international polity.”).
229 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (emphasis added).
230 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
231 A democratic polity that is committed to basic civil and human rights must carefully
calibrate the balance between majority rule and minority voice. This is an especially salient
problem in times of national insecurity. See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 45 (describing
the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Palmer Raids, the McCarthy era, and post–9/11 actions).
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noncitizen) is essentially a person who is not a citizen.232 As to citizenship we do,
of course, have some legal definitions (both constitutional and statutory), catego-
rized as jus soli, jus sanguinis, derivation, and naturalization.233 But in practice, even
these apparently clear categories may break down, both as to definitions and as to
rights. For example, we now know that many people who were born in the United
States have been wrongly deported due to an inability to prove their citizenship status
(combined with insufficient attention to the issue by ICE and even some Immigration
Judges).234 Those who may have derived citizenship through their parents, in one of
the myriad complex possible scenarios that have changed repeatedly over the years,
face even greater hurdles in proving their citizenship status.235 The fact is that a non-
trivial number of citizens mistakenly participate in (or are treated by others within)
the polity as noncitizens.236 Conversely, some noncitizens may participate as citizens,
though this may be illegal, as in the case of using a false passport, misrepresenting
oneself as a citizen to gain employment, or voting.237
As Professor Rogers Smith has noted, many think of “American citizenship” as
something that “should be and now largely is an essentially uniform status, conferring
the same legal rights and duties on all those who possess it.”238 But this has never
been either “wholly empirically true or normatively uncontested.”239 Historically, of
course, the meaning of U.S. citizenship has varied tremendously for women, minors,
and Native American Indians and many other members of racial and ethnic minor-
ity groups.240 Naturalized citizens have a more tenuous status than do native-born
citizens.241 There are still substantial complexities for citizens of Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, Northern Marianas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands who cannot vote
in U.S. national elections.242 There has been continuing debate as to whether one
232 KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH, supra note 209, at 30 (2012) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)
(2006)).
233 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006).
234 KANSTROOM, supra note 45, at 98–102.
235 Id. at 100.
236 See, e.g., Lee J. Teran, Mexican Children of U.S. Citizens: “Viges Prin” and Other Tales
of Challenges to Asserting Acquired U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR 583 (2012) (describing
how many children, in particular those born abroad to a U.S. parent, do not know that they
have a claim to citizenship and may still be deported when living in the United States).
237 Why is the wrongful designation by ICE of a citizen as a noncitizen not similarly illegal?
I am grateful to Jackie Stevens for this framing.
238 Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Sovereignty and Uniformity: The Challenges for Equal
Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century, 122 HARV. L. REV. 907, 907 (2009) (book review).
239 Id. at 907; see also ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 14 (1997).
240 SMITH, supra note 239, at 912–14. In addition, as Smith notes, “[c]orporations came
to possess a form of jurisdictional citizenship. Overseas merchants could sometimes gain a
form of ‘commercial’ citizenship.” Id. at 912.
241 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2006) (listing bases for denaturalization and expatriation).
242 The Electoral College system authorizes such voting only in admitted states and the
District of Columbia. See De La Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80 (2000) (citing U.S.
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may be a citizen of Puerto Rico but not a citizen of the United States.243 And one must
note, too, the extremely serious, racialized problem of millions of disenfranchised
U.S. citizen felons.244
The residual, noncitizen category is itself multifaceted, encompassing millions
of undocumented people, short-term visitors, “parolees” who are deemed not legally
present, many temporary visa statuses, refugees, asylum-seekers, and applicants for
a host of other statuses and permanent residents.245 As the Supreme Court has put
it, “the class of aliens is itself a heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-
ranging variety of ties to this country.”246 Rights may vary greatly with status.247 For
CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1). Puerto Ricans and other U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico
cannot vote in presidential elections. See id. at 83 (citing Igortua v. United States, 842 F.
Supp. 602 (D.P.R. 1914)).
243 See Colon v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (1998), aff’d, 170 F.3d 191 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1003 (1999), reh’g denied, 528 U.S. 1107 (2000). A United
States citizen, born in Puerto Rico and a resident of Puerto Rico, executed an oath of renun-
ciation before a U.S. consular officer in the Dominican Republic. Id. at 44. The State Department
rejected the renunciation, because the Plaintiff had demonstrated no intention of renouncing
all ties to the United States in that he wanted to remain a resident of Puerto Rico. Id. at 45. The
court rejected Colon’s petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State to ap-
prove a Certificate of Loss of Nationality because, although “claiming to renounce all rights
and privileges of United States citizenship” he wanted to “continue to exercise one of the
fundamental rights of citizenship, namely the right to travel freely throughout the world and
when he wants to, to return and reside in the United States.” Id. at 46; see also Ramirez de
Ferrer v. Mari Brás, 144 D.P.R. 141 (1997) (reaffirming Puerto Rican citizenship); Hon.
Fernando Bonilla, P.R. OP. Sec. Just. 2006-41 (2006).
244 The Sentencing Project reports that, as of 2010, some 5.85 million citizens were dis-
enfranchised due to criminal records, a figure that is approximately 9% higher than 2004; and
a dramatic rise from the estimated 1.17 million disenfranchised in 1976. Christopher Uggen,
Sarah Shannon & Jeff Manza, State-Level Estimates of Felon Disenfranchisement in the
United States, 2010, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org
/detail/news.cfm?news_id=1334&id=133.
245 Forced Apart (by the Numbers), Appendix H, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (showing the
many categories of noncitizen), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/appendixh.pdf.
246 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78–79 (1976).
247 Viet Dinh has argued that “[a]t a practical level, drawing the line at permanent residents
does not weed out corrupting foreign influence in our political process, but it does preclude
meaningful participation and inculcation of American values for scores of noncitizens seek-
ing to be full Americans.” Viet D. Dinh, A Matter of Distinction, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/01/05/should-foreign-money-be-allowed-to
-finance-us-elections/the-us-should-encourage-engagement; see also Brief for the Ill. Coal.
for Immigrants & Refugee Rights and the Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (No. 11-275) (arguing, inter
alia, that “[t]here is no meaningful constitutional distinction between aliens classified as
‘permanent residents’ under the INA and other foreign citizens residing in this country”).
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example, lawful permanent residents have been recognized as having a greater array
of constitutional rights than do the undocumented.248
Two decades ago, Professor Rogers Brubaker asserted that the distinction be-
tween citizens and foreigners was “conceptually clear, legally consequential, and
ideologically charged.”249 While the distinction is surely legally consequential and
ideologically charged, its conceptual clarity—both in theory and in practice—must,
I think, be qualified and questioned. This, I suggest, argues in favor of a relatively
fluid, functional approach to noncitizen polity-participation.
II. NONCITIZEN LITIGATION AS POLITY-PARTICIPATION
The rule . . . has its impact on an identifiable class of persons
who, entirely apart from the rule itself, are already subject to
disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the community.
Aliens are not entitled to vote and, as alleged in the complaint,
are often handicapped by a lack of familiarity with our language
and customs. . . . By reason of the Fifth Amendment, such a
deprivation must be accompanied by due process.
—Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong250
A. What Does “Votelessness” Have to Do with Participation?
Noncitizens (especially the undocumented) face major impediments to polity-
participation in the United States. As Dean Kevin Johnson has described: “[l]ocked
out of the political process, this discrete and insular minority has the threat of de-
portation hanging over its head like the Sword of Damocles.”251 It is often the very
vulnerability of noncitizens that leads them into courts where they may participate
in a potentially more protective environment.252
248 The judges who decided the Bluman case explicitly noted that they were not deciding
whether Congress could constitutionally extend the current statutory ban to “lawful per-
manent residents who have a more significant attachment to the United States than the tem-
porary resident plaintiffs in this case.” Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp.2d 281, 292 (D.D.C.
2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). Such an extension, they wrote, “would raise substantial
questions not raised by this case.” Id.
249 ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 21
(1992).
250 426 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1976) (footnote omitted).
251 Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration
Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1544 (1995).
252 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not “Sleeping,” Giant: The Devastating
Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
1259, 1264–65 (2008).
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This brings us back to Justice Robert Jackson’s phrase: “a voteless class of
litigants,” used in the case of Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath.253 The case involved a
challenge to certain practices that had long been a part of U.S. deportation law but
that were violative of the newly enacted Administrative Procedure Act (APA).254
Justice Jackson was well aware of, and had strong opinions about, some of the de-
portation excesses of his time.255 His adjectival description of deportees as “voteless”
might imply that aliens, because they were “a voteless class” were entitled to greater
protections under the APA, as it should be interpreted, than were citizens.256 This
reading, clearly related to the concept of special rights protections for “discrete and
insular minorities,”257 is supported by the phrase that follows Jackson’s naming of
the “voteless class:” “who are strangers to the laws and customs in which they find
themselves involved.”258 Note how this extends Madison’s model: it moves from
“even if [aliens are not parties to the Constitution]” to “because.”259 The exclusion
from political power is not merely irrelevant, it is a reason for greater judicial pro-
tection.260 A constitutional due process holding could logically follow, protecting
deportees’ procedural rights, regardless of the technical requirements of the APA.261
The phrase, “a voteless class of litigants” is thus intriguingly evocative. It straddles
(and to some degree blurs) the line between politics and law.262
The problem for noncitizens is deeper than minority status, however. They do
not get out-voted; they cannot vote at all.263 A further complication is that—unlike
253 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1950).
254 Id. at 35.
255 See KANSTROOM, supra note 45, at 204–05.
256 See Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 46.
257 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
258 Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 46.
259 See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
260 Similarly, Jackson’s focus on noncitizens’ lack of voting rights could also mean that
he assumed that if they had had the right to vote then deportation proceedings would not
have been exempted from APA coverage. What was then § 7(a) of the APA (now codified
as § 556(b)) excepted deportation proceedings from the APA as “the conduct of specified
classes of proceedings . . . by or before boards or other employees specially provided for by
or designated under statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2006). The 1966 codification, however, was
intended “to restate, without substantive change,” the pre-existing sections of the APA. See
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 631 (1966).
261 In its second sense, however, the phrase, “a voteless class of litigants” could also imply
an overestimation of the power that minorities might gain by having the right to vote. As noted,
above, Martin Luther King, Jr. once defined “just law” in this way: “[A] code that a majority
compels a minority to follow that it is willing to follow itself.” KING, supra note 38, at 294.
262 This problem, of course, is not confined to racial, ethnic or religious minorities. Welfare
recipients have the right to vote. See F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets:
The Race for the Top, 5 S. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (1997). But that surely does not mean that
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), was superfluous.
263 Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976).
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race—the difference between citizens and aliens is an ostensibly legitimate differen-
tiation. Citizenship status is no longer based on race but on place of birth, parentage,
or naturalization choices. The citizen/alien divide is arguably just because it applies,
generally, to all people, in all nation-states, on the basis of criteria (place of birth,
parentage, voluntary naturalization) that are themselves seen as, if not perfectly just,
then at least not invidious.264 The problems it may cause are thus more typically seen
as questions of basic human rights, of the limits of discrimination, or of proportion-
ality in enforcement, than as fundamental questions of political legitimacy.265 And
yet Justice Jackson’s description of noncitizens (especially deportees) as a “voteless
class of litigants” invokes the relationship between politics and law as both are under-
taken by noncitizens. This relationship is marked by more than simply an expansion
or contraction of noncitizens’ rights claims as such. In this sense, noncitizen litiga-
tion has long been a powerful and essential revitalizing force that may benefit not
only the litigants themselves (if they win) but also the polity as a whole. Indeed, this
revitalizing benefit may result from lost cases as much as from successful ones: it
is the fact of meaningful participation that counts.
B. Legal Exclusions of Noncitizens from Polity-Participation
The Supreme Court has often examined the exclusion of noncitizens from cer-
tain forms of polity participation.266 Its approach, well described as a “doctrinally
inelegant history,”267 has evolved considerably over time.268 It differs dramatically in
the state versus the federal context;269 and is profoundly deferential when immigra-
tion control is implicated.270 As the Court itself has candidly noted, the cases “have
not formed an unwavering line over the years.”271
In the early twentieth century, the Court upheld state laws prohibiting “aliens”
from owning land,272 possessing a shotgun or rifle for hunting wildlife,273 as well as
laws that excluded noncitizens from public works contracts.274 The Court developed
264 See generally Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
265 Id. at 648–49.
266 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219–20 (1984).
267 Schauer, supra note 147, at 1509.
268 Id. at 1509–10.
269 Id. at 1511–12.
270 KANSTROOM, supra note 45, at 178.
271 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 72 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
272 Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923).
273 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (upholding state law that prohibited the
killing of any wild bird or animal by any such foreign-born person except in defense of per-
son or property, and “to that end” making it unlawful for any such person to own or be pos-
sessed of a shotgun or rifle).
274 Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915). But see Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)
(upholding private employment rights).
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a “special public interest” doctrine that deferred to a state’s concern with “the re-
striction of the resources of the state to the advancement and profit of the members
of the state.”275 Members meant citizens.276 In 1915, then Judge Cardozo had jus-
tified such polity-exclusion in rather stark terms: “The people,” he wrote, “viewed
as an organized unit, constitute the state.”277 And the “members of the state are its
citizens.”278 “Society thus organized, is conceived of as a body corporate” which
may “enter into contracts, and hold and dispose of property . . . through agencies of
government.”279 These agencies, in turn, “are trustees for the people of the state.”280
To be sure, there were certain limitations on the powers of those agencies in which
citizens had an interest.281 But Judge Cardozo’s most crucial point was that “an alien
has no such interest, and hence results a difference in the measure of his right.”282
This approach began to change in the 1940s as the Court came to see such laws
as increasingly unjustifiable. In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,283 the
Court concluded that California could not use federally created “racial ineligibil-
ity for citizenship as a basis for barring Takahashi from earning his living as a
commercial fisherman” in coastal waters.284 Though the Court’s reasoning was rath-
er summary, Justice Murphy’s concurrence offered a strong anti-discrimination
rationale.285 He noted that the statute was “but one more manifestation of the
anti-Japanese fever which has been evident in California in varying degrees since
275 People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 161, aff’d sub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195
(1915) (holding that a state statute regarding employment of laborers is not unconstitutional
under the equal provision clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it makes distinctions
between aliens and citizens); see also Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (upholding
denial of license to run a billiard parlor); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (upholding
state law which forbade contractors’ use of noncitizen employees).
276 Crane, 214 N.Y. at 160.
277 Id. at 160.
278 Id. (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1876); Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875)).
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 161. For example, government “may not by arbitrary discriminations having no
relation to the public welfare, foster the employment of one class of its citizens and discourage
the employment of others.” Id. “Every citizen has a like interest in the application of the pub-
lic wealth to the common good, and the like right to demand that there be nothing of partiality,
nothing of merely selfish favoritism, in the administration of the trust.” Id.
282 Id.
283 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
284 Id. at 412; see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649 (1948) (Black, J., concurring).
See generally Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1063–64 (1979) (discussing the Court’s use of the Supremacy
Clause in alien-based discrimination claims); Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New
Preemption Analysis, 89 YALE L.J. 940 (1980) (arguing that a preemption model should
replace equal protection analysis in alienage jurisprudence).
285 See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 427 (Murphy, J., concurring).
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the turn of the century.”286 In a strong call for a revitalized equal protection jurispru-
dence, Murphy concluded:
We should not blink at the fact that § 990, as now written, is a
discriminatory piece of legislation having no relation whatever
to any constitutionally cognizable interest of California. It was
drawn against a background of racial and economic tension. It
is directed in spirit and in effect solely against aliens of Japanese
birth. It denies them commercial fishing rights not because they
threaten the success of any conservation program, not because
their fishing activities constitute a clear and present danger to the
welfare of California or of the nation, but only because they are of
Japanese stock, a stock which has had the misfortune to arouse
antagonism among certain powerful interests.287
Even state laws without such racial connections that discriminate on the basis
of alienage must now generally withstand “strict” judicial scrutiny.288 In Graham v.
Richardson,289 the Court held that “[s]tate laws that restrict[ed] the eligibility of
[noncitizens] for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict[ed]
with . . . overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the
Federal Government.”290 More importantly, though, the Court held that these state
statutes had created “two classes of needy persons [who were] indistinguishable
except” for their citizenship status.291 Noting that an alien is a “person” for equal
protection purposes, the Court further recognized alienage as a suspect classification
that requires “heightened judicial solicitude.”292 As the Court now put it, “[a]liens
as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”293 The Court has since invalidated
state statutes that denied noncitizens the right to pursue various occupations, in-
cluding permanent state civil service positions,294 membership in the State Bar,295
286 Id. at 422 (citing Oyama, 332 U.S. at 650 (Murphy, J., concurring); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
287 Id. at 426.
288 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“[C]lassifications based on alienage,
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom
such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” (footnotes and citations omitted)).
289 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
290 Id. at 378.
291 Id. at 371.
292 Id. at 371–72.
293 Id. at 372 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
294 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
295 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
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and the practice of civil engineering.296 Such cases have also reflected the rejection
of the “right/privilege” doctrine for purposes of due process analysis.297
One exclusionary formulation is of particular interest for this Article: the Court
has endorsed the idea that noncitizens may legitimately be excluded from those
forms of polity-participation that are deemed to be “intimately related to the process
of democratic self-government.”298 The Court has tried to distinguish “between the
economic and sovereign functions of government.”299 In so doing, it has echoed the
argument that, “although citizenship is not a relevant ground for the distribution of
economic benefits, it is a relevant ground for determining membership in the polit-
ical community.”300 Though the theoretical basis for such a distinction is, to my mind,
exceedingly problematic, one can see why it seems a serviceable model for the Court
given the basic ambiguities of citizenship discussed above. Examples of acceptable
exclusions have included serving as jurors, working as police or probation officers
and even teaching in public schools.301 Cases involving schools and teachers have in-
spired especially intricate reasoning. Teachers, held the Court in Ambach v. Norwich,302
like police officers, possess a high degree of responsibility and discretion in the ful-
fillment of a basic governmental obligation.303 “Further, a teacher serves as a role
model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their percep-
tions and values.”304 More specifically, the Court concluded that “a teacher has an
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political
296 See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); see also Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219–20 (1984) (discussing the Court’s invalidation of statutes denying
aliens the right to pursue certain occupations); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11 (1977)
(discussing the Court’s decisions in Sugarman and Griffiths).
297 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 374; see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6
(1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
298 Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012)
(quoting Bernal, 476 U.S. at 220).
299 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 438 (1982).
300 Id.
301 See, e.g., id. (upholding a law barring foreign citizens from working as probation offi-
cers); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a law barring foreign
citizens from teaching in public schools unless they intend to apply for citizenship); Foley
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding a law barring foreign citizens from serving as
police officers); Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (upholding a law barring
foreign citizens from serving as jurors); cf. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648–49
(1973) (finding state civil service restriction unconstitutional, but noting that “citizenship is
a permissible criterion for limiting” the “right to vote or to hold high public office”).
302 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
303 Id. at 76.
304 Id. at 78–79.
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process, and a citizen’s social responsibilities.”305 “This influence” was held to be
“crucial to the continued good health of a democracy.”306
Is the use of citizenship status a valid proxy for such qualities? In the public
school teacher case, four Justices dissented vigorously, noting that these statutes
originated “in the frantic and overreactive days of the First World War when atti-
tudes of parochialism and fear of the foreigner were the order of the day.”307 The
dissenters questioned whether citizenship status made a person a proper role model
for attitudes towards government and social responsibilities.308 The dissenters also
challenged the majority’s most basic assumptions about education and polity-
participation.309 “Is it better,” they polemically asked:
to employ a poor citizen teacher than an excellent resident alien
teacher? Is it preferable to have a citizen who has never seen Spain
or a Latin American country teach Spanish to eighth graders and
to deny that opportunity to a resident alien who may have lived
for 20 years in the culture of Spain or Latin America?310
Describing the citizenship bar as “artificial” and “a stultifying provision,” they
saw it as “disregarding . . . the diverse elements that are available, competent, and
contributory to the richness of our society and of the education it could provide.”311
When these dissenters later joined a Court majority, they revisited the relationship
between political self-definition and polity-participation in the context of public
school education. The outcome was different. In Plyler v. Doe,312 the Court thus
noted that if undocumented children were not educated, then the “stigma of illiter-
acy [would] mark them for the rest of their lives.”313 This would “deny them the
ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions” and would foreclose
305 Id. at 79.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that this particular citizenship requirement
had its origin in 1918 N.Y. Laws, ch. 158, effective Apr. 4, 1918).
308 The dissenters pointed out that both teachers in the case had been in this country for
over 12 years. Id. at 84–85. Each was married to a United States citizen. Id. at 85. Each met
all the requirements, other than citizenship, for a public school teacher. Id. And, perhaps
most importantly, each was “willing, if required, to subscribe to an oath to support the
Constitutions of the United States and of New York.” Id.
309 Id. at 87; see also Note, Aliens’ Right to Teach: Political Socialization and the Public
Schools, 85 YALE L.J. 90, 108–11 (1975).
310 Ambach, 441 U.S. at 87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
311 Id. at 88.
312 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
313 Id. at 223.
442 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:399
any possibility of their contributing “in even the smallest way to the progress of
our Nation.”314
Such reasoning goes to the heart of our understanding not only of citizenship
and the polity, but also of constitutional democracy itself. The Court, unsurprisingly,
has vacillated. In a case involving qualifications for police officers, “a State’s histor-
ical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions”
was said to be “part of the sovereign’s obligation to preserve the basic conception
of a political community.”315 Exclusion of “aliens” was not seen by the Court, as it
might have been, as a “deficiency in the democratic system” but rather as a “neces-
sary consequence of the community’s process of political self-definition.”316 The act
of becoming a citizen, on this view,
is more than a ritual with no content beyond the fanfare of cere-
mony. A new citizen has become a member of a Nation, part of
a people distinct from others. The individual, at that point, be-
longs to the polity and is entitled to participate in the processes
of democratic decisionmaking.317
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger bluntly stated in Foley, with Aristotelian flourish, that
“the right to govern is reserved to citizens.”318
To be sure, the legal exclusion of noncitizens from this sort of polity-participation
in the United States has limits. As Chief Justice Burger also noted in 1971:
The decisions of this Court with regard to the rights of aliens liv-
ing in our society have reflected fine, and often difficult, ques-
tions of values. As a Nation we exhibit extraordinary hospitality
to those who come to our country, which is not surprising for we
have often been described as “a nation of immigrants.”319
As noted, “the Court has treated certain restrictions on [noncitizens] with ‘height-
ened judicial solicitude,’ a treatment deemed necessary since aliens [in a formulation
by Chief Justice Burger that followed Justice Jackson’s] have no direct voice in the
314 Id.
315 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295–96 (citations omitted) (quoting Sugarman v.
Dougal, 413 U.S. 634, 647–48 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
316 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (emphasis added).
317 Foley, 435 U.S. at 295 (citation omitted).
318 Id. at 297.
319 Id. at 294 (citation omitted).
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political processes.”320 To put this another way, the tension between acceptable
political exclusion from polity-participation and anti-discrimination norms has led
the Court to hold that the political function exception, described above, must be very
narrowly construed.321 Otherwise the exclusionary exception would swallow the rule
and depreciate the powerful significance that constitutional law attaches to protec-
tion of a discrete and insular minority.322
In the federal context, the Court has tended to defer much more to the political
branches. The level of scrutiny in such cases is looser, and the underlying theory of the
importance of citizenship tends to be stronger.323 Thus, “overriding national interests
may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service even
though an identical requirement may not be enforced by a State.”324 As the Court rather
crudely put it in Mathews v. Diaz325: “Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly
320 Id. (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), and citing United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
321 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11 (1977). One might see it as a parsing of the nation-
al community into separate political versus economic spheres. See, e.g., MARK GIBNEY,
STRANGERS OR FRIENDS 61 (1986).
322 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 161–62 (1980) (arguing in favor of
special judicial solicitude due to exclusion from political participation).
323 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
324 See id. at 101. The Court assumed “without deciding that the national interests iden-
tified by the petitioners would adequately support an explicit determination by Congress or
the President to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service.” Id. at 116; see also Jalil v.
Campbell, 590 F.2d 1120, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the President may bar
noncitizens from employment in the federal civil service by executive order); Vergara v.
Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that national interests may justify a
citizenship requirement in federal service).
325 426 U.S. 67 (1976). In Mathews, the Court upheld a Federal law that excluded non-
citizens from Medicare unless they were permanent residents who had lived in the United
States for at least five years. Id. at 80, 82. The Court accepted that:
[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigra-
tion, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if ap-
plied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power
to deport have no permissible counterpart in the Federal Government’s
power to regulate the conduct of its own citizenry. The fact that an Act
of Congress treats aliens differently from citizens does not in itself im-
ply that such disparate treatment is “invidious.”
In particular, the fact that Congress has provided some welfare ben-
efits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens.
Id. at 79–80 (footnotes omitted).
In light of the government’s plenary power to regulate “aliens” within its borders subject
only to a “narrow standard of review,” the Court deferred to Congress and found that neither
the requirement of permanent residency nor the durational residency requirement was “wholly
irrational.” Id. at 81–83.
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agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can
advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty that a consci-
entious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its guests.”326
Similarly, the Court has recently upheld a lower court ruling rejecting noncitizens’
constitutional challenges to a federal law that bans certain foreign nationals, except for
lawful permanent residents, from making certain politically related expenditures.327
Even in cases dealing with federal laws, however, the Court has expressly rejected the
assertion “that the federal power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the National
Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules
from those applied to citizens.”328 Finally, as noted, in the realm of immigration con-
trol and deportation measures, deference reaches its peak.329
C. Vanguard Rights Litigation
Legal claims of rights made by and on behalf of noncitizens have powerfully in-
fluenced the development of U.S. constitutional law and rights theory.330 Prominent
obvious examples include the vigorous constitutional debates spurred by the Alien
and Sedition Acts,331 the Dred Scott case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,332 free speech and free
association cases involving noncitizens in the early and mid-twentieth century,333
and Plyler v. Doe. Less obvious examples include the Guantánamo cases (especially
326 Id. at 80. The Court continued: “The decision to share that bounty with our guests may
take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country: Congress
may decide that as the alien’s tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal
share of that munificence.” Id. See generally Johnson, supra note 251, at 1519–28; Michael
Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 994–1002
(analyzing the application of the plenary power doctrine to noncitizen benefit restrictions).
327 Bluman v. FEC, 899 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 303, 116 Stat. 81, 96), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087
(2012). The law prohibits expenditures that “expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
political candidate.” Id. at 284. It also bars contributions to political parties or to outside groups
if funds would be used for candidates, parties, or express advocacy. Id. As construed by the
D.C. District Court, the statute does not purport to bar issue advocacy. Id.
328 Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 102.
329 See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 45 (examining the nature and history of the
U.S. government’s power to detain and deport).
330 I am grateful to my colleague, Kari Hong, for reminding me that the history of cov-
erture provides interesting and important analogies to this pattern.
331 1 Stat. 566 (1798); 1 Stat. 570 (1798); 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (1918)); 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
332 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
333 See generally COLE, supra note 88.
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Boumediene v. Bush)334 Padilla v. Kentucky,335 and much current litigation about
state and local anti-immigration laws, such as Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,336
and Arizona v. United States.337
Such litigation may compel reconsideration of citizenship itself. Dred Scott, for
example, showed that “[a] relationship between government and the governed that
turns on citizenship can always be dissolved or denied [because] [c]itizenship is a legal
construct, an abstraction, a theory.”338 Cases brought by “aliens” have also contributed
to important expansions of noncitizens’ rights, as in Yick Wo,339 Plyler,340 and Padilla.341
These cases—perhaps with the ironic benefit of hindsight—may be called “vanguard”
rights litigation. The relative openness of the U.S. legal system to vanguard claims—
as contrasted with the exclusion of noncitizens from voting—has also facilitated a
remarkable degree of noncitizen participation in broad legal transformations that are
not necessarily associated with immigration law, alienage law, or citizenship status.342
Yick Wo, for example, though its precise holding, and its precedential value pre–
Brown v. Board of Education343 have been contested,344 was surely an essential step
334 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). The promise of Boumediene, that detainees would have a mean-
ingful opportunity to challenge their detention in federal court, has not been kept. As Judge
Tatel noted in his dissent in Latif v. Obama, that, “it is hard to see what is left of the Supreme
Court’s command in Boumediene.” 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (applying a presumption of
regularity to government reports and remanding the case to determine the petitioner’s cred-
ibility, despite the court’s reliance on his declaration in their finding that the government report
was “not sufficiently reliable” to justify detention); see also Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746
(2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012). Mr. Latif died, alone in his cell, after ten years in
custody at Guantanamo. See Marc Falkoff, Op-Ed., A Death at Gitmo, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-falkoff-gitmo-detainee-death
-20120920,0,4034278.story.
335 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
336 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
337 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
338 BICKEL, MORALITY, supra note 142, at 53.
339 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (equal protection).
340 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (education).
341 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (effective assistance of counsel as to deportation consequences).
342 See, e.g., Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.
343 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
344 See Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008
U. ILL. L. REV. 1359. Chin argued that the traditional view of Yick Wo was mistaken and that
the case “was about neither race discrimination nor prosecution.” Id. Rather, “[r]ead in the
context of the jurisprudence of its time . . . [the case] is completely consistent with Plessy v.
Ferguson and stands primarily for the mundane point that a valid treaty trumps inconsistent
state law.” Id. at 1359–60. But see David Bernstein, Revisiting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1393 (highlighting the fact that Yick Wo explicitly cited the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and that contemporary commentators—including retired Justice Miller—saw it as con-
stitutionally expansive).
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in the evolution of equal protection and due process discourse and doctrine.345 In-
deed, a recent LexisNexis search for the term “Yick Wo” in the federal court cases
database showed 1,675 hits, of which many had nothing at all to do with aliens or
noncitizens.346 Padilla, as we shall see, has already inspired deep rethinking of the
notion of collateral consequences in criminal constitutional law as well as the role
of counsel more generally.347
To be sure, cases brought by noncitizens are not always successful for them. Nor
are the consequences for citizens’ rights claims always expansive. Besides Dred Scott,
the most well-known examples of “plenary power” reasoning, Chae Chan Ping v.
United States348 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States,349 laid the conceptual “plenary
power” groundwork for later cases involving both citizens and noncitizens.350 Apart
from the often criticized dreadful effects that such cases have had on noncitizens’
rights claims,351 they can exert gravitational force in other areas of law.352 Their prin-
ciples may, in Robert Jackson’s evocative metaphor, “lie[ ] about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an ur-
gent need.”353 There can be little doubt that some of the Bush Administration’s poli-
cies in the wake of 9/11 were facilitated by a legacy of judicial deference to government
power regarding virtually any government action denominated as immigration en-
forcement, even though some such policies involved citizens.354
345 See id. at 1373; Lenese Herbert, On Precedent and Progeny: A Response to Professor
Gabriel J. Chin’s “Doubts About Yick Wo,” 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1415. Professor Herbert
argued that, despite its doctrinal limitations or the complexities of its motivation, the ex-
pansive reading of Yick Wo, has triumphed. See id. “Its story, placed in the context of and
alongside many other similar stories, making a significant story of impact.” Id. at 1424. One
might note in this celebratory mode that there is a Yick Wo Elementary School. See YICK
WO ELEMENTARY SCH., http://www.yickwo.org/yves/about (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
346 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(public education and racial integration); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (sodomy
laws); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty rights). Search results on file with the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal.
347 See infra notes 437–59 and accompanying text.
348 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
349 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
350 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally KANSTROOM,
supra note 45.
351 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245–46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
352 See generally Juliet Stumpf, The Implausable Alien: Iqbal and the Influence of Immi-
gration Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2010) (examining the “subterranean impact
of immigration law” on Iqbal and worrying about the “tremendous impact” the case may
have on the “survival of civil complaints [more] generally”).
353 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
354 See KANSTROOM, supra note 45, at 229–31; see also COLE, supra note 88, at 74.
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Vanguard rights cases are neither inevitably brought—nor are they always
resolved—on constitutional grounds. Consider Ashcroft v. Iqbal,355 which presaged
heightened pleading standards in a wide range of civil cases alleging government
misconduct.356 Javaid Iqbal was arrested in November 2001, on fraud-related
charges and was placed in pretrial detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center
in Brooklyn, New York.357 He claimed that on the day he was transferred to the
special unit, prison guards, without provocation, “picked him up and threw him
against the wall, kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged
him across the room.”358 He averred that after being attacked a second time he
sought medical attention but was denied care for two weeks.359 His complaint further
alleged that prison staff in the special unit subjected him to unjustified strip and
body cavity searches,360 verbally berated him as “a terrorist” and “Muslim killer,”361
refused to give him adequate food,362 and intentionally turned on air conditioning
during the winter and heating during the summer.363 He also claimed that prison staff
interfered with his attempts to pray and engage in religious study,364 and with his
access to counsel.365
Iqbal alleged that FBI officials had carried out a discriminatory policy by des-
ignating him as a person “of high interest” in the investigation of the September 11
attacks solely because of his “race, religion, and/or national origin.”366 In his Bivens
action,367 Iqbal contended that then–Attorney General Ashcroft and then–FBI Director
Mueller “were at the very least aware of the discriminatory detention policy and con-
doned it (and perhaps even took part in devising it), thereby violating his First and
Fifth Amendment rights.”368
355 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
356 See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir.
2011); Anor v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3404 (2010).
357 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d by 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
358 Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at para. 113, Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 490 F.3d 143
(2d Cir. 2007) (No. 04-CV-1809).
359 Id. at para. 187–88.
360 Id. at para. 136–40.
361 Id. at para. 87.
362 Id. at para. 91.
363 Id. at para. 84.
364 Id. at para. 153–54.
365 Id. at para. 168.
366 Id. at para. 51. He had been “placed in the detention center’s Administrative Maximum
Special Housing Unit for over six months while awaiting the fraud trial.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (2009).
367 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that
federal officials may be liable for injuries caused by their Fourteenth Amendment violations).
368 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Court majority held that knowledge and acquiescence in subordinates’ use
of discriminatory criteria to classify detainees is insufficient to state a Bivens claim.369
Thus, “each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for
his or her own misconduct.”370 As the majority continued, “purpose rather than knowl-
edge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional
discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising
from his or her superintendent responsibilities.”371
This, as the dissent highlighted, was a significant restriction that had neither
been briefed nor argued.372 Moreover, the majority also offered a noteworthy reading
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires only that a pleading must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”373 The Court held that Iqbal had failed to meet even this low standard.374
The majority found that Iqbal had asserted that petitioners “knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]” to harsh “conditions of confine-
ment as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest.”375 He had alleged that Ashcroft
was the “principal architect” of this invidious policy,376 and that Mueller was “in-
strumental” in adopting and executing it.377 The majority, however, called his claims
“bare assertions,” that amounted “to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the
elements.’”378 Most strikingly, the majority conceded that, if taken as true (as they
should be at this stage of litigation), Iqbal’s “allegations [were] consistent with
petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees ‘of high interest’ because of their
race, religion, or national origin.”379 But the majority then enunciated a rather strict
369 Id. at 1949.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).
373 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
374 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51. The Court also held that “the pleading standard Rule 8
announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an un-
adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further
factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.
375 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (citing Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at para. 96,
Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 04-CV-1809)).
376 Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at para. 10, Iqbal, 490 F.3d 143 (No. 04-CV-
1809).
377 Id. at para. 11.
378 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
379 Id.
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new standard: that “given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish
this purpose.”380
The potential significance of this holding as a precedent was well stated by
Justice Souter in his dissent. The majority had effectively (and without argument or
briefing on the relevant point) “do[ne] away with supervisory liability under Bivens,”381
and had misapplied the pleading standard.382 Their concerns were prescient: Iqbal
has had profound effects.383 Indeed, the case has modified the pleading standard in
many types of cases, especially those brought by minorities and noncitizens.384 As
Erwin Chemerinsky noted:
380 Id. (emphasis added). The Court continued:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hi-
jackers who counted themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda,
an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab
Muslim—Osama bin Laden—and composed in large part of his Arab
Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of
their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental
impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to
target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respondent alleges the
arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his nondis-
criminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United
States and who had potential connections to those who committed ter-
rorist acts. As between that “obvious alternative explanation” for the
arrests and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us
to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.
Id. at 1951–52 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567) (citation omitted).
381 Id. at 1955–57 (Souter, J., dissenting). Ashcroft and Mueller had “made the critical
concession that a supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct and
deliberate indifference to that conduct are grounds for Bivens liability.” Id. at 1957. The
dissenters saw the Court’s holding as broad and preclusive: “Lest there be any mistake, in
these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating
Bivens supervisory liability entirely.” Id.
382 Id. at 1958–61.
383 Justice Ginsburg, perhaps just a bit intemperately, has said that the case “messed up”
the civil pleading standard. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
Remarks for Second Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_06-12
-09.html).
384 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal creates an unduly
“thick” model for complaints); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly
and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (concluding that the per-
centage of Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted in cases alleging civil rights violations increased
from 50% under Conley to 55% under Twombly to 60% under Iqbal); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (2009) (arguing that discrimi-
nation, antitrust, conspiracy, and products liability claims are affected by Iqbal); Comment,
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It is difficult to overstate the importance of this case since it sets
the standard for pleading in almost every civil case in federal court.
It is unclear how a district court is to decide whether allegations are
“plausible.” This standard would seem to give a great deal more
discretion to district courts in deciding whether to dismiss cases.385
In one measure of Iqbal’s influence, “in the single year after it was decided, [the
case was] cited six times by the Supreme Court, over 300 times by the courts of
appeals, and more than 6,500 times by district courts.”386 Moreover, “[t]he pleading
requirement set out in Iqbal has” had restrictive effects in cases that go “beyond the
Bivens claims at issue in that case” to such other causes of action as Section 1981
and Title VII.387
D. Immigration Law Cases
Noncitizens’ claims within the existing immigration system may also have more
general legal impact, such as greater judicial oversight of administrative agencies. An
early example of this phenomenon is the 1915 case of Gegiow v. Uhl.388 In Gegiow,
a group of “aliens” who had sought to enter the United States were detained for depor-
tation by the Acting Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of New York, who
found that they were inadmissible on the ground that they were “likely to become
public charges.”389 The reason was based on the state of the labor market in the city
(Portland, Oregon) to which they were headed.390
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Holmes, re-
jected the government’s reliance upon the fact that, this was “a group of illiterate
laborers,” only one of whom, spoke “even the ordinary Russian tongue.”391 The gov-
ernment had asserted “that their ignorance tended to make them form a clique to the
detriment of the community.”392 The Court, in a typical Holmesian formulation, saw
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 123 HARV. L. REV. 252, 261–62 (2009) (arguing that
Iqbal imposes impossible pleading burdens and confers too much discretion on judges);
Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of
Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 927–28 (2010) (arguing that civil rights cases are adversely
affected by Iqbal).
385 Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN
BAG 413, 415 (2009).
386 Ramzi Kassem, Iqbal and Race: Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority
Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2010).
387 Id.
388 239 U.S. 3 (1915).
389 Id. at 8.
390 Id. at 8–9.
391 Id. at 8.
392 Id.
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this as merely, “a trouble incident to the immigration of foreigners generally which
it is for legislators not for commissioners to consider.”393 Thus, it was to “be laid on
one side.”394 The Court further determined that an alien could not be declared “likely
to become a public charge” on the ground that the labor market in the city of his
immediate destination was “overstocked.”395 The operative statute was interpreted to
mean, contrary to the Commissioner’s reading, that “[t]he persons enumerated . . .
are to be excluded on the ground of permanent personal objections accompanying
them irrespective of local conditions.”396
The significance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gegiow can be best understood
by comparing it to the opinion it reversed.397 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
had seen the matter as quite simple and easily controlled by prior precedent.398 The
sole question, they ruled, was “whether there was any evidence to sustain the finding
of the immigration officials that each of these aliens is liable to become a public
charge.”399 In an earlier case,400 the Second Circuit had “considered the action of the
immigration officers final in every case where there was any evidence to support
it.”401 The reasons were basic: first, summary processes were both necessary and
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id. at 10. The Court noted that the operative statute, the Act of February 20, 1907,
authorized exclusion of “[p]ersons likely to become a public charge,” and that this class was
“mentioned between paupers and professional beggars, and along with idiots, persons dan-
gerously diseased, persons certified by the examining surgeon to have a mental or physical
defect of a nature to affect their ability to earn a living, convicted felons, prostitutes and so
forth.” Id.
396 Id. The “public charge” exclusion was “presumably . . . to be read as generically sim-
ilar to the others mentioned before and after.” Id. As Justice Holmes further noted, “[t]he
statute deal[t] with admission to the United States, not to Portland” and “contemplate[d] a
distribution of immigrants after they arrive.” Id. It would have been “an amazing claim of
power if commissioners decided not to admit aliens because the labor market of the United
States was overstocked,” let alone one city. Id. “Detriment to labor conditions [was] allowed
to be considered,” but only as to the whole, “continental territory of the United States, and
the matter [furthermore was] to be determined by the President.” Id. Thus, the Court could
not “suppose that so much greater a power was entrusted by implication in the same act to
every commissioner of immigration . . . or that the result was intended to be effected in the
guise of a decision that the aliens were likely to become a public charge.” Id.
397 See United States ex rel. Gegiow v. Uhl, 215 F. 573 (2d Cir. 1914), rev’d by 239 U.S.
3 (1915).
398 Id. at 574–75.
399 Id. at 573. The law said “that the decision of the appropriate immigration officers, if
adverse to the admission of the alien, shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary
of the Department of Labor.” Id. “[T]he decision of the board of special inquiry [had been]
affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor.” Id.
400 United States ex rel. Rosen v. Williams, 200 Fed. 538 (1912), cert. denied, 232 U.S.
722 (1914).
401 Gegiow, 215 F. at 574.
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desirable.402 Moreover, “the members of these boards [had] . . . the great advantage
of seeing the immigrant and determining from personal observation and examination
his fitness to enter the country.”403 The Second Circuit, to say the least, did not ex-
hibit a welcoming attitude towards “huddled masses yearning to breathe free.”404 As
one judge wrote, “[i]t is plain from a reading of the law that degenerates or those so
constituted mentally, physically or morally that they may be a burden upon or a
menace to society, are not wanted here.”405
As to the Gegiow litigants, the court highlighted that, “no one of the immigrants
can speak our language or any language that is understood in this country.”406 They
came “from a remote province of Russia and [had] no one [in the U.S. who was]
under legal obligation to support them.”407 “They know no trade and only one can
read or write in his own language. . . . They were not employed and no actual promise
of employment had been given them.”408 Thus, wondered the court,
how long after reaching Portland would it be before these immi-
grants became public charges? As soon as [their funds were] ex-
hausted, what is to support them? What is to prevent them from
being thrown upon the charity of the town? It is, true that they
may succeed in obtaining work, but it is . . . equally true, that
they may not do so.409
And it was “the latter contingency which ma[de] them undesirable aliens.”410
“Certainly,” said the court, “we cannot find that the decision of the board, that they
are likely to become public charges, has no evidence to support it; on the contrary,
the conclusion seems to follow directly from the facts.”411
The differences in approach are fundamental. The lower court, in essence, held
that “Congress has placed the determination of these questions in the hands of
trained officials and their conclusions upon disputed questions of fact are final and
conclusive.”412 The Supreme Court, heralding the sort of greater scrutiny of the
402 Id. (“In the nature of the case these inquiries must be swift and summary. The formality
of court proceedings cannot be had and is not expected where, in many cases, witnesses
cannot be produced for examination and cross-examination.”).
403 Id.
404 EMMA LAZARUS, SELECTED POEMS 58 (John Hollander ed., 2005).







412 Id. at 575.
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administrative process that would, a generation later, culminate in the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act, demanded much more.413
Gegiow was soon cited by the Supreme Court in support of a proposition that was
perhaps implicit within it but upon which Justice Holmes had not much expounded:
that a legally admitted alien must have “the privilege of entering and abiding in the
United States, and hence of entering and abiding in any State in the Union.”414 In
Truax v. Raich,415 the Court considered an Arizona statute that required that at least
eighty percent of an employer’s workforce had to be citizens of the United States.416
The law’s supporters “sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the
State to make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the health, safety,
morals and welfare of those within its jurisdiction.”417 But the Supreme Court con-
cluded that such authority, though broad, did not empower a State “to deny to lawful
inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a
livelihood.”418 Indeed, the Court asserted that:
[i]t requires no argument to show that the right to work for a
living in the common occupations of the community is of the
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was
the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. If this could
be refused solely upon the ground of [either] race or nationality,
the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protec-
tion of the laws would be a barren form of words.419
More recent examples of this sort of immigration-related vanguard litigation
include Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath,420 and the fascinating recent case of Judulang
413 See Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1924) (holding that warrants of deportation
could not issue until executive officials made individualized findings that aliens were unde-
sirable residents). The effect of Gegiow in the Second Circuit appears, however, to have been
rather limited in deportation cases. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Georgian v. Uhl, 271 F.
676, 677 (2d Cir. 1921) (upholding deportation on political speech grounds with minimal,
if any, judicial scrutiny).
414 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915).
415 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
416 Id. at 35.
417 Id. at 41.
418 Id.
419 Id. (citations omitted) (citing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, 590 (1897); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886);
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111
U.S. 746, 762 (1884)). In support of this proposition, the Court cited both some cases that
involved noncitizens and some that did not. Id.
420 One might also view Marcello v. Bonds in this way. 349 U.S. 302 (1955). Although
the noncitizen lost, and as Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black noted in dissent, an
important due process point was missed by the Court: “A fair hearing necessarily includes
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v. Holder.421 The Judulang case resolved a tortuously complicated question about a
so-called “relief provision” of deportation law known as Section 212(c).422 In a dis-
armingly simple opinion, the Court unanimously concluded that the policy used by
the Board of Immigration Appeals was “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA.423
The Court used the esoteric vehicle of an immigration case not only to vindicate the
noncitizens’ rights but also, quite possibly, to reinvigorate a rather robust version
of “arbitrary and capricious” review.424
E. Boundary Cases
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board 425 exem-
plifies how the Court is sometimes called upon to mark the boundaries between
immigration enforcement and noncitizens’ polity-participation. The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) had ordered back pay to an undocumented worker who
was laid off from his job because of union activities that are protected under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).426 The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision,
held that such an award to the undocumented worker conflicted with the policies of
U.S. immigration laws, particularly the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA),427 which prohibited employment of certain undocumented noncitizens.428
The noncitizen employee had presented false documentation when he was hired.429
The Supreme Court majority concluded that back pay should not be awarded “for
years of work not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned,
and for a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud.”430 Put simply, Justice
Rehnquist saw a clear hierarchy of legal values. Although the employer had violated
labor law, he opined, “awarding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes the
immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations.”431
an impartial tribunal.” Id. at 315 (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The
Long, Complex, Futile Deportation Saga of Carlos Marcello, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 113
(David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
421 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
422 Id. at 477.
423 Id. at 479.
424 I predict that this version will have, as we say, “legs” in other administrative law arenas.
425 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
426 Id. at 140; see ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 151 et.
seq. (2006)).
427 Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
428 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140. IRCA requires employees to present documents establish-
ing identity and authorization to work at the time they are hired. Id. at 148 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(a)(1)). An employer must check those documents and cannot knowingly hire some-
one who is not authorized to work. Id.
429 Id. at 140–41.
430 Id. at 149.
431 Id. at 150. As the Court noted, “[l]ack of authority to award backpay does not mean
that the employer gets off scot-free.” Id. at 152. “The Board [had] already imposed other
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Justice Breyer, in dissent, saw the matter quite differently.432 He highlighted that
all the relevant agencies (including the Department of Justice) had told the Court
that the Board’s “backpay order would not interfere with the implementation of
immigration policy.”433 Indeed, their view was that, “it reasonably helps to deter un-
lawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent” and was
thus lawful.434 The most specific concern was that “in the absence of the backpay
weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least once
with impunity.”435 The key distinction, in the terms of this Article, was that the major-
ity read immigration policies quite broadly to limit noncitizens’ polity-participation
through labor organizing, whereas the dissenters recognized the complexity of im-
migration enforcement and the dangers of lowering the costs to employers of labor
law violations.436
F. Proxy Cases
Noncitizens’ legal cases sometimes involve a more complex, dialogic phenom-
enon: the rights claims of noncitizens may serve as proxies for more general, fun-
damental consideration of the analogous rights claims of citizens. Put another way,
the legal system’s adjudication may mark a new conceptualization of the right itself.
significant sanctions against Hoffman . . . . These include orders that Hoffman cease and
desist its violations of the NLRA, and that it conspicuously post a notice to employees setting
forth their rights under the NLRA and detailing its prior unfair practices.” Id. (citing Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Arauz, 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 100-01 (1992)).
432 The dissent was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg. Id.
at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
433 Id.
434 Id.
435 Id. at 154.
436 Including, ironically, the possibility that this would increase the “incentive to find and
to hire illegal-alien employees.” Id. at 155. It is interesting in this regard to note how much
was not decided in Hoffman. As the U.S. Department of Labor interprets the decision:
The Supreme Court’s decision does not mean that undocumented work-
ers do not have rights under other U.S. labor laws. . . . The Supreme
Court did not address laws the Department of Labor enforces, such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA), that provide core labor
protections for vulnerable workers. . . . The Department’s Wage and
Hour Division will continue to enforce the FLSA and MSPA without
regard to whether an employee is documented or undocumented.
Fact Sheet #48, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (July 2008), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance
/whdfs48.htm (“The FLSA requires employers to pay covered employees a minimum wage
and, in general, time and a half an employee’s regular rate of pay for overtime hours. The
MSPA requires employers and farm labor contractors to pay the wages owed to migrant or
seasonal agricultural workers when the payments are due. . . . Enforcement of these laws is
distinguishable from ordering back pay under the NLRA.”).
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A recent example of this phenomenon is the link between Padilla v. Kentucky and
Missouri v. Frye.437
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court upheld a noncitizen’s claim that his criminal
defense counsel was ineffective due to allegedly incorrect advice concerning the risk
of deportation.438 This was a path-breaking decision, virtually unprecedented in the
long history of U.S. deportation law.439 In a formulation that implicitly adopts a strong
version of due process protections for deportees, the Court recognized that “[d]epor-
tation as a consequence of a criminal conviction [has such a] close connection to the
criminal process [that it is now] uniquely difficult to classify it as either a direct or a
collateral consequence.”440 The two systems, in short, have become inextricably linked.
As a result of these changes, “[t]he ‘drastic measure’ of deportation or removal is now
virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.”441 The
Court said that deportation had become “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants
who plead guilty to specified crimes.”442 From this logic, one can see why substan-
tial due process protections, if not the more specific protections normally tied to the
criminal justice system, are warranted.443 Padilla was a very significant decision for
deportation law, with virtues of both logic and justice. Though largely styled as a Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel decision, the case raised many constitutional questions
about the formalistic distinction between criminal punishment and deportation.444
Indeed, Padilla might portend a constitutional reconciliation between the Court’s
historical formalism and a more appropriate realism. This new constitutional norm
for post-entry social-control deportation, which I have termed the Fifth-and-a-Half
437 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
438 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
439 See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1461 (2011).
440 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. Further, the Court recognized that “[t]he landscape of fed-
eral immigration law has changed dramatically.” Id. at 1478. In the past, “there was only a
narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to pre-
vent deportation.” Id. But now, the regime contains a much expanded class of deportable
offenses, and it has “limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of
deportation.” Id.
441 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
442 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
443 See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000).
444 The former, of course, is a criminal sanction, with extensive, specific constitutional pro-
tections. Id. at 1902–03. The latter has been said to be civil or, at most, “quasi-criminal.” Id.
at 1921. Padilla implicitly challenges this model. It cannot be squared with the historical, for-
malist relegation of deportation to the realm of civil collateral consequences in which, for ex-
ample, there is no clear constitutional right to counsel. See Kanstroom, supra note 439, at 1473.
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Amendment, embodies both the flexible due process guarantees of the Fifth Amend-
ment and—at least for certain types of deportation—some of the more specific pro-
tections of the Sixth Amendment, such as a right to counsel.445 Beyond this, consider
the effects of Padilla outside the immigration/deportation context.446
In Frye, the respondent had been charged with driving with a revoked license.447
Due to three prior convictions for the same offense, he was charged with a felony
that carried a potential four-year prison term.448 The prosecutor sent Frye’s counsel
a letter, offering two possible plea bargains, including an offer to reduce the charge
to a misdemeanor and to recommend a ninety-day sentence.449 Frye’s counsel did not
convey the offers to him, and they expired.450 Less than a week before Frye’s prelim-
inary hearing, he was again arrested for driving with a revoked license.451 He then
pleaded guilty with no underlying plea agreement and was sentenced to three years in
prison.452 In post-conviction motions, he alleged that his counsel’s failure to inform
him of the earlier plea offers had denied him the effective assistance of counsel, and
he testified that he would have pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor had he known of
the offer.453 The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy,
held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the
consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected, as it applies at “all ‘critical’
stages of the criminal proceedings.”454 The Court then prominently cited Padilla v.
Kentucky, as a case in which “[t]he Court made clear that ‘the negotiation of a plea
bargain is a critical’” stage for ineffective-assistance purposes and in which the
Court had rejected the argument made by the State in Frye that a knowing and
voluntary plea supersedes defense counsel’s errors.455
One might, at first, think that the fact that Padilla involved noncitizens is ir-
relevant, a sort of artifact. But this is not correct. There was something crucial for
Justice Stevens about Padilla’s rights claim that was deeply tied to his status as a
noncitizen. That, in turn, spurred a revitalization of the rights claim that was then
reinforced for citizens (and of course for noncitizens, too) in Frye.456 As Justice
Kennedy noted in the majority opinion in Frye, the Padilla Court had “held that a
445 See Kanstroom, supra note 439, at 1473.
446 For an interesting exploration of the potential impact of Padilla, see Margaret Colgate
Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation,
31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87 (2011).
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guilty plea, based on a plea offer, should be set aside because counsel misinformed
the defendant of the immigration consequences of the conviction.”457 The Court,
more generally, had made clear in that context that “the negotiation of a plea bargain
is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.”458 Thus, Padilla—a case that straddled the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments in its conceptual underpinnings and that was grounded on a non-
citizen’s rights claim—provided the conceptual grounding for the Court’s affirma-
tive answer to the basic question at issue in Frye: “whether the constitutional right
to counsel extends to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or
are rejected.”459
G. Federalism Cases
Noncitizens have often sought to distinguish between the federal government’s
power to regulate immigration and that of states and localities.460 In the 1915 case
of Truax v. Raich,461 discussed above, which involved an Arizona law mandating
that eighty percent of employees be U.S. citizens,462 the Court had reasoned that
“reasonable classification implies action consistent with the legitimate interests of [a]
State, and . . . these cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring them into hostility to
exclusive Federal power.”463 “The authority to control immigration—to admit or ex-
clude aliens”—had previously been determined to be “vested solely in the Federal
Government.”464 Therefore, assertion by a state of authority to deny to lawfully ad-
mitted noncitizens the opportunity of earning a livelihood
would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them
entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where
457 Id. (emphasis added).
458 Id. (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486). It also rejected the argument made by peti-
tioner in this case that a knowing and voluntary plea supersedes errors by defense counsel.
Cf. Brief for Respondent at 27, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651)
(arguing Sixth Amendment’s assurance of effective assistance “does not extend to collateral
aspects of the prosecution” because “knowledge of the consequences that are collateral to
the guilty plea is not a prerequisite to the entry of a knowing and intelligent plea”).
459 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
460 See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10–17 (1982) (invalidating a state university pol-
icy to charge nonresident fees to nonimmigrants lawfully domiciled in the state); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (invalidating a Pennsylvania law which burdened noncitizens
as inconsistent with federal law); cf. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding that fed-
eral law did not preempt California law prohibiting employment of undocumented immigrants).
461 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
462 Id. at 35.
463 Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
464 Id. at 42 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)).
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they cannot work. . . . The practical result would be that those
lawfully admitted to the country would be segregated in such of
the States as chose to offer hospitality.465
The apparent clarity of this model was substantially called into question by
DeCanas v. Bica,466 which involved a challenge to a California statute that had
provided that “[n]o employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the [country] if such employment would have an adverse effect
on lawful resident workers.”467 The Supreme Court concluded that the California
statute was not an unconstitutional attempt to regulate immigration, even if it had
some “speculative and indirect impact on immigration.”468 Moreover, the statute was
not preempted under the Supremacy Clause by the Immigration and Nationality
Act.469 The state statute was seen as being within the state’s police power to regulate
employment, which at the time had not been completely precluded by federal laws.
Ten years after DeCanas, however, Congress passed 8 U.S.C. § 1324a which makes
it “unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for
employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized
alien.”470 As we have seen, this federal control over employment had powerful ef-
fects in Hoffman.
In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,471 the Court revisited these questions in
the context of an Arizona law regulating the employment of undocumented non-
citizens.472 The plaintiff argued that the federal statute preempted the state statute,
which provided for suspension and revocation of business licenses for entities em-
ploying unauthorized noncitizens.473 The Arizona statute also required employers to
verify employees’ immigration status using an online database.474 The federal statute
expressly preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other
than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer
for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”475 The Court held that the Arizona
statute was not preempted, because “Arizona’s procedures simply implement the
sanctions that Congress expressly allowed the States to pursue through licensing
laws.”476 The Court also noted that Arizona had acted in an area of traditional state
465 Id.
466 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
467 Id. at 352 (citing CAL LAB. CODE § 2805(a)) (West 2012).
468 Id. at 355–56.
469 Id. at 358.
470 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2006).
471 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
472 Id. at 1973.
473 Id. at 1977.
474 Id. at 1985 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (2010) (West)).
475 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (emphasis added).
476 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1971.
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concern, as “[r]egulating in-state businesses through licensing laws” is not an area
of exclusive federal interest.477
CONCLUSION: NONCITIZEN PARTICIPATION BY LITIGATION
To discover the Constitution, we must approach it without the as-
sistance of some philosophical guide imported from another time
and place.
—Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law478
Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business.
—Martha Nussbaum, For Love of Country479
Although Athenian democracy barred much formal polity-participation by
women, slaves, colonial subjects, and aliens, Aristotle, a noncitizen metic (roughly,
a legally resident alien), wrote that one should not posit as citizens all those people
“without whom you could not have a city.”480 “Citizenship,” he thought, “required
a certain excellence.”481 Slaves and aliens, as Michael Walzer put it, “stood within
the arena, simply by virtue of being inhabitants of the protected space of the city-
state; but they had no voice there. . . . They were the subjects of a band of citizen-
tyrants, governed without consent.”482
This is thankfully not the case in the United States today, notwithstanding the ar-
guable arbitrariness of birthright citizenship status,483 and the very serious disadvan-
tages to polity-participation and threats to life plans and family that noncitizens face.
The overlapping interests of citizen and noncitizen community groups have
resulted in powerful coalitions in both the social and the political spheres.484 But,
477 Id.
478 Ackerman, supra note 141, at 454.
479 NUSSBAUM, supra note 119, at 15.
480 WALZER, supra note 111, at 54 (quoting ARISTOTLE, supra note 109, at 93); see also
I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 10 (1988).
481 WALZER, supra note 111, at 54. 
482 Id.
483 Joseph Carens contends that “[c]itizenship in Western liberal democracies is the
modern equivalent of feudal privilege—an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life
chances . . . . [It] is hard to justify when one thinks about it closely.” Joseph H. Carens,
Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251, 252 (1987).
484 Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1991) (noting how collaborations between womens’ rights activists
and immigrant groups successfully overturned aspects of the immigration marriage fraud
laws and developed gender guidelines for persecution in asylum claims). Similarly, lesbian
and gay organizations worked successfully with immigrant rights groups to convince Congress
to repeal the statutory provision that had allowed exclusion from admission into the United
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counterintuitively perhaps, the contribution of noncitizens to public discourse and to
the polity is often most effectively accomplished through the legal system. Nonciti-
zens, including the undocumented, are uniquely positioned to understand, to cri-
tique, and to improve the meaning of citizenship and constitutional democracy. This
is both despite and because of the threats and disadvantages they experience.485 For
noncitizens, law is a uniquely powerful and crucially important form of communica-
tive interaction. Indeed, the law’s “potential to” connect what Habermas called the
“lifeworld to the systemic machinery of the economy and the administrative state”
is a most powerful form of polity-participation in the U.S. system of a constitutional
scheme of rights not exclusively based on citizenship status.486 Through the legal
system, noncitizens are thus a crucial part of a “circular process that recursively feeds
back” into engagement and debate.487 Since legitimate lawmaking both responds to
and generates communicative power from below, noncitizens play a central role in
translating communicative power into administrative power and law.
As one who has made his career delineating the oppressive aspects of our regime
of deportation, I fully recognize that this perspective may seem a bit Polyanna-ish.
My goal has most certainly not been to justify current exclusions or to somehow use
access to courts as a substitute for the full and free polity-participation that a (properly)
weak version of citizenship and a truly strong version of human rights protections
would entail. Until that happens, however, those who decry or seek to restrict liti-
gation by “illegal aliens” should face the strong rejoinder that such cases—in long-
standing, durable, crucially important ways—have benefited not only “them,” but
all of us, together.
States on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g., James R. Edwards Jr., Homosexuals and
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recognize that the various spheres cannot be perfectly disaggregated.
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